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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT -LIABILITY LIMITA-
TIONS - Liability Limitations Under the Universal Postal
Union Convention Apply to Air Carriers Acting as Agents
of the United States Postal Service. Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan
American World Airways, 783 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3232 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1986) (No. 85-
2109).
The dispute between these parties centers around
eleven packages of diamonds.' In 1980 the plaintiffs (col-
lectively referred to as "Lerakoli") sent the diamonds by
United States Postal Service (USPS) registered mail from
New York City to Antwerp, Belgium. 2 The USPS pack-
aged the diamonds in three mail sacks and delivered them
to Pan American World Airways (Pan Am), an air carrier
for the USPS. 3 Subsequently, the diamonds disappeared.
4
Lerakoli filed suit in New York State Supreme Court
against USPS and Pan Am in 1982. 5 The defendants re-
moved the action to federal court.6 Thereafter, USPS and
I Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 783 F.2d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3232 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1986) (No. 85-2109).
2 Id. The parties agreed in a Stipulation and Pre-Motion Order that the eleven
packages at issue were all accepted, and separately receipted, by the USPS as reg-
istered mail. Appellant's Brief at 4, Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 783
F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-7503) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
" Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 34. The parties also stipulated that postal records show
that Lerakoli's parcels were in three mail sacks and that Pan Am received these
three mail sacks from the USPS. Appellant's Brief at 4.
4 Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 34. Two of the sacks never arrived in Belgium. Id. The
third sack ended up in Germany, but without the plaintiff's packages.
- Id. at 34 n.2.
6 Id. Parties may remove actions to federal court pursuant to the following
guidelines:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the de-
fendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending....
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Pan Am moved for summary judgment.7 The district
court dismissed the claims against the USPS, but not the
claims against Pan Am.8 Rather, the district court held
that the liability limitations contained in the Universal
Postal Union Convention apply to air carriers acting as
agents for the USPS, and thus, limited Pan Am's liability.9
Lerakoli appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.' 0 Held affirmed. Liability limita-
tions under the Universal Postal Union Convention apply
to air carriers acting as agents for the United States Postal
Service. Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, 783
F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3232 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 1986) (No. 85-2109).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
An understanding of the Lerakoli decision requires a ba-
sic knowledge of some general legal procedures and pro-
positions. For example, federal statutes set forth the
procedure by which Pan Am became a mail carrier for the
USPS." In addition, Pan Am is an agent of the USPS so
agency principles are important.' 2 However, the relation-
ship between a sender of mail, the USPS, and Pan Am is
centered in bailment.' 3 Because this case revolves around
liability limitations found in a section of the Universal
Postal Union Convention known as the Lausanne Con-
vention, the background and content of the Lausanne
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982).
1 Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 34. The USPS argued that its liability was limited, while
Pan Am claimed that it had the same immunity from liability as that enjoyed by the
USPS. Appellant's Brief at 3.
" Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 34. The court dismissed the claim against the USPS be-
cause the USPS had tendered to Lerakoli its limit of liability under the Lausanne
Convention, $15.76 per registered item. Id. See also infra notes 88-98 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Lausanne Convention.
11 Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,107 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
lo Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 35.
1 See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proce-
dures by which the USPS transports the mail.
,2 See infra notes 23-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of agency law.
1" See infra notes 55-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of bailment.
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Convention are important.' 4 Finally, English courts have
addressed similar issues in light of their own statutes,'
5
while American courts have decided the liability limitation
question in the context of the Warsaw Convention.'
6
Therefore, analogizing these holdings to Lerakoli is
helpful.
A. Transporting the Mail
An initial issue in Lerakoli is the procedure by which the
USPS transports mail. The United States Postal Service is
responsible for carriage of the mail.' 7 One contemporary
method of mail carriage is by air.'" An air carrier trans-
ports the mail based on either a contract with the govern-
ment' 9  or as part of its certificate. 20  The statute
14 See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the postal
liability limitations of the Lausanne Convention.
15 See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of analogous
English cases based on English statutory limitations.
16 See infra notes 109-138 and accompanying text for an analogy to liability limi-
tations contained in the Warsaw Convention.
71 39 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1982), provides that the USPS "shall provide prompt,
reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all areas and shall render postal serv-
ices to all communities."
18 See generally The Commercial Aviation Industry: Report of the Antitrust Subcomm. of the
Howe Comm. on the Judiciary on the Airlines Industry, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958),
reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 1-2 - 1-8 (2d ed. 1981) (discusses the
history of how air carriers became involved in the carriage of mail).
19 39 U.S.C. § 5402 (a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
The postal service may contract with any certified air carrier, without
advertising for bids, in such manner and under such terms and con-
ditions as it deems appropriate for the transportation of mail by air-
craft between any of the points in foreign air transportation between
which the carrier is authorized by the Secretary of Transportation to
engage in the transportation of mail.
Id.
.20 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1) (1982), states that "[wjhenever so authorized by it certif-
icate, any air carrier shall provide necessary and adequate facilities and service for
the transportation of mail, and shall transport mail whenever required by the
United States Postal Service. Such air carrier shall be entitled to receive reason-
able compensation therefore as hereinafter provided." This statute section went
out of effect on January 1, 1985, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(4)(A) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). This fact is not crucial to this case because the Second Circuit
apparently intended for the Lerakoli holding to apply to both contract air carriers
and certificate air carriers. This intention is evidenced by a footnote from the
Lerakoli opinion which states that "[wihile Pan Am alleges that it is a contract car-
rier for the USPS, the record is unclear as to whether Pan Am was carrying Ler-
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governing the transportation of foreign mail provides that
both United States regulations and international postal
conventions govern air carriers involved in foreign air
transportation and foreign mail transportation. 2' Because
Pan Am transports mail overseas for the USPS, this stat-
ute governs its actions.2 2
B. Agency Law
Because Pan Am transports mail for the USPS, a special
relationship exists between Pan Am and the USPS.
Courts have traditionally considered a carrier of the mail
to be an agent of the USPS. 23 The existence of an agency
depends upon a number of factors including intent, con-
trol, benefit, and consent.24 When one applies these fac-
akoli's mail pursuant to a contract with the USPS or pursuant to a provision in its
certificate of necessity and convenience." Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36 n.6. Thus, be-
cause the Second Circuit did not rely on this fact in deciding the case, the distinc-
tion between the two types of carriers is unimportant.
21 49 U.S.C. § 1375(0(1) (1982).
Any air carrier holding a certificate to engage in foreign air transpor-
tation and transporting mails of foreign countries shall transport
such mails subject to control and regulations by the United States.
The United States Postal Service shall from time to time fix the rates
of compensation that shall be charged the respective foreign coun-
tries for the transportation of their mails by such air carriers, and
such rates shall be put into effect by the United States Postal Service
in accordance with the provisions of the postal convention regulat-
ing the postal relations between the United States and the respective
foreign countries, or as provided hereinafter in this section.
Id.
22 Id.
2-3 Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 225 U.S. 640, 649 (1912) (held
a railway company to be an agent of the government because it transported mail,
and, therefore, subject to government decisions as to what services it must per-
form as a mail carrier). See also Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry. v. Summerfield, 229
F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (stating that
although the Postmaster General had the right to start an air mail program there
remained an agency relationship between the railroads and the United States);
United Fruit Co. v. United States, 33 F.2d 664, 666 (5th Cir. 1929) (holding that
United States could recover value of registered mail stolen while in the carrier's
custody because the carrier was acting as an agent of the government).
V4 See, e.g., In re Schulman Transp. Enter., 744 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 1984) (in
determining if Pan Am was an agent of Shulman Air Freight, Inc. for purposes of
priority in bankruptcy proceeding, the court emphasized the factors of consent
and control); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Continental Shippers Ass'n, 642 F.2d
236, 238 (8th Cir. 1981) (in an action brought by common carrier against shipper-
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tors to the relationship between a mail carrier and the
USPS, it is apparent that mail carriers truly are agents of
the USPS. 25 The intent element is satisfied by both parties'
intention to enter into a mail carriage contract. Federal
statutes give the USPS control over the agent carrier.26
Obviously, both parties benefit because the postal service
gets its mail delivered, while the carrier receives compen-
sation. Finally, consent is shown by the carriage contract
itself. Therefore, the USPS-mail carrier relationship satis-
fies each of these factors and an agency results.
While the factors composing an agency are definite,27
the courts have not settled other aspects of agency law.
The agent's use of its principal's liability limitations is one
such area. The First Restatement provided that an agent
could utilize his principal's immunities.28 Various courts
members of shippers' association for freight charges, the court examined all
agency factors). See generally Cordes v. Wooten, 476 So. 2d 89, 91 (Ala. 1985) (in
an action for damages brought against the driver and the owner of a hayrake for
injuries sustained by a motorcyclist in a collision, the court held that whether the
driver of the hayrake was an agent of the owner of the hayrake was a question
properly submitted to the jury); Salt River Valley Water Users' Assoc. v. Giglio,
113 Ariz. 190, 549 P.2d 162, 169 (1976) (water users' association was not an agent
of the United States government because the government did not have control
over the association's day-to-day activities); Holmes v. McKey, 383 P.2d 655, 665-
66 (Okla. 1963) (action to establish constructive trust as to property wherein
spouse, children, and heirs of prior vendor intervened to set aside and cancel
deeds under which bank officer-escrow agent asserted title); Fernander v.
Thigpen, 278 S.C. 140, 293 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1982) (action to determine if assis-
tant manager was apparent agent of franchiser); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1 (1958); Wyse, A Framework of Analysis for the Law of Agency, 40 MONT. L.
REV. 31, 33 (1979). "Agency is a question of intent and generally the agent must
be acting under the control of the principal and for the principal's benefit." Salt
River Valley, 549 P.2d at 167.
25 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
26 See supra notes 19-21 for the text of the applicable statutes.
27 See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors in-
cluded in an agency relationship.
28 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 347 (1933). "[A]n agent who is acting within his
authority is entitled to the immunities of the principal which are not personal to
the principal." Id. See A.M. Collins & Co. v. Panama R.R. Co., 197 F.2d 893 .(5th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952) (stevedore, acting as an agent within
his authority, was entitled to claim $500 limitation of liability provided by the bill
of lading); Clark v. Rogers, 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 484 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (in an action brought by a horse trainer injured while at work, the court
allowed the defendant ranch owner to share the defendant horse owner's employ-
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have applied the original Restatement's position to nu-
merous fact situations.2 9 The drafters of the Second Re-
statement reversed this provision, by stating that the
principal's immunities do not pass to the agent.3
ment relationship defense because the ranch owner was an agent of the horse
owner).
The comments to the Restatement provide the following:
Persons may have a personal immunity from liability with respect to
all persons and for all acts, as in the case of the sovereign, or for
some acts, as in the case of an insane persons, or as to some persons,
as in the case of the immunity of a husband to the wife. Such immu-
nities result from the personal qualities of the individual or the per-
sonal relationship of the parties. Unlike certain privileges ... , such
immunities cannot be delegated. On the other hand, when an im-
munity exists in order more adequately to protect the interests of a
person in relation to his property, the agent may have the principal's
immunities. Thus, the servant of a landowner while acting in the
scope of his employment is under no greater duties to unseen tres-
passers than is the landowner; towards such he may, without liabil-
ity, be guilty of injurious conduct which would create liability against
him if done in a neutral place.
Illustrations:
1. A, the driver of a municipal fire wagon, drives recklessly to a fire,
injuring T. A may be liable to T although the municipality is not.
2. P, the father of T, a minor child, directs his servant, A, to give T
a severe beating. If A exceeds the privilege which a parent has to
punish a child, A is subject to liability to T in an action of tort,
although P would not be so liable.
3. P's chauffeur, A, drives on P's land on P's business without using
care not to run over persons whom he has reason to know may be
present. He runs over T, a trespasser, without being aware of his
presence. A is no more liable to T than P would be had he injured T
under the same circumstances.
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 347 comment a and illustrations (1933).
29 See, e.g., Herzog v. Mittlemen, 155 Or. 624, 65 P.2d 384, 388 (1937) (in an
action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident while
plaintiff was riding as a gratuitous guest, the court allowed the driver of the car to
share the car owner's immunity of gratuitous undertaking because the driver was
the agent of the owner); Harris v. State, 115 Ga. 608, 41 S.E. 983 (1902) (mother's
agent has the right to chastise child for disobedience and escape liability as the
mother would).
M, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 347 (1958). "An agent does not have
the immunities of his principal although acting at the direction of the principal."
Id. This position is explained in the comments:
Immunities exist because of an overriding public policy which serves
to protect an admitted wrongdoer from civil liability. They are
strictly personal to the individual and cannot be shared.
Illustrations:
1. A, the driver of a municipal fire wagon, drives recklessly to a fire,
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The United States Supreme Court addressed this same
liability issue in 1922. In Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. ,31 the Court ad-
dressed the issue of an agent's relationship to its princi-
pal's immunities. The United States Supreme Court
consolidated three separate cases involving the United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation
(Fleet Corporation) into the Sloan Shipyards decision.3 2
In the first two cases, the Fleet Corporation acted as de-
fendant. One case involved a contract between the plain-
tiff, Sloan Shipyards, and the Fleet Corporation obligating
the shipyard to build sixteen wooden vessels.3 3 The plain-
tiff in the second case, Astoria Marine Iron Works, also
had a contract with the corporation. 4 In these two cases,
injuring T. Aside from statute, A is liable to T, although the munici-
pality is not.
2. P, the father of T, a minor child, directs his servant A, to give T a
severe beating. If A exceeds the privilege which a parent has to pun-
ish a child, A is subject to liability to T in an action of tort, although
P would not be so liable.
Id. at comment a, illustrations 1-2.
See, e.g., Aungst v. Roberts Constr. Co., 95 Wash. 439, 625 P.2d 167 (1981)
(because an agent who fraudulently misrepresents material facts is subject to lia-
bility even though the fraud occurs in a transaction made on behalf of the princi-
pal, the purchasers of memberships in Indian tribe's camping club could bring
action alleging violation of the Consumer Protection Act and the Securities Act of
Washington against the company which had a contract with the tribe to develop
the club and sell its memberships, regardless of the company's status as an agent
of the tribe).
- 258 U.S. 549 (1922).
32 Id. Congress passed the Shipping Act of 1916 in contemplation of the possi-
bility of World War I. The current version of the Act is codified at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 801-42 (1982). The Shipping Act of 1916 established the United States Ship-
ping Board. The Act gave the Board the power to form the Fleet Corporation.
The purpose of the Fleet Corporation was to purchase, construct, and operate
merchant vessels. Id. at 564.
The three cases consolidated in Sloan Shipyards were Sloan Shipyards Corp. v.
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.; Astoria Marine Iron Works
v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.; and, United States Ship-
ping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Wood. Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 549.
-1:1 Id. at 565. Two other complainants in this action, Capital City Iron Works
and the Anacortes Shipbuilding Company, were subsidiaries of Sloan Shipyards.
Sloan Shipyards organized the two subsidiaries for the purpose of carrying out the
contract with the Fleet Corporation. Id.
.1 Id. at 569. The Court attached no importance to the fact that this contract
was made with the Fleet Corporation "representing the United States of
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the plaintiffs both alleged that the Fleet Corporation vio-
lated the terms of its contract. 35  Fleet Corporation ar-
gued that as an agent of the United States government, it
was immune from suit. 36  The third case consolidated
before the Supreme Court concerned a contract between
Eastern Shore Shipbuilding Corporation and the Fleet
Corporation for the building of six harbor tugs. 37 After
signing the contract, Eastern Shore declared bank-
ruptcyA8 The Fleet Corporation filed suit to gain a prior-
ity claim against the estate of Eastern Shore.39 In this
case, the Fleet Corporation argued that because it was an
agent of the United States, it should have a preferred
claim just as the United States would.4 °
The United States Supreme Court did not accept the
Fleet Corporation's argument in any of the three cases.4'
Instead, the Court ruled that the privileges and immuni-
ties of the government did not extend to its agents.42
America." According to the Court, "[tihe Fleet Corporation was the contractor,
even if the added words had any secondary effect." Id. at 568.
-, Id. at 565, 569. Sloan Shipyards claimed the Fleet Corporation refused to
make payments and then unlawfully took possession of Sloan Shipyards' property.
Id. at 565. The specifics of Astoria's claim are not discussed in the opinion. Id. at
569.
36 Id. at 566. The Fleet Corporation claimed they were given so much power
that they were "put in place of the sovereign." Id.
,7 Id. at 570.
38 Id.
39 Id. Though the Fleet Corporation presented the claim in its own name, the
Corporation represented itself as an instrumentality of the United States govern-
ment. Id.
40 Id. The referee, district court, and appellate court each denied the claim. Id.
41 Id. at 568, 570.
42 Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 567.
An instrumentality of government he might be and for the greatest
ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not cease to be an-
swerable for his acts.... In general the United States cannot be sued
for a tort, but its immunity does not extend to those that acted in its
name.
Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 567-68. Cf Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507 (1888)
(collector of customs is not personally liable for torts committed by subordinates).
The Court in Robertson stated:
The government itself is not responsible for the misfeasances or
wrongs, or negligences, or omissions of duty of the subordinate of-
ficers or agents employed in the public service .... A public officer
or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or positive wrongs,
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Thus, an agent is answerable for his acts and cannot bene-
fit from his principal's immunity.43 Because the Fleet Cor-
poration could not utilize the government's privileges, it
was not immune to suit in the first two cases and could not
gain a priority claim in the third.44
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Sloan
Shipyards decision in Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machin-
ery Corp.4 5 In Herd, the Court addressed the issue of
whether an ocean carrier's statutory liability limitations
applied to a stevedore hired to load cargo onto the ship.46
The ocean carrier brought the action to recover for dam-
age to its cargo allegedly caused by the negligent actions
of the stevedore.47 The defendant stevedore denied liabil-
ity.48 Alternatively, the stevedore, relying on A. M. Collins
& Co. v. Panama Railroad Co.,49 argued that, if liable, the
carrier's liability limitations applied to it.50  The Herd
court, however, refused to accept this argument. 51 It re-
lied on Sloan Shipyards and other previous court opinions
in holding that the stevedore could not utilize the ocean
or for the nonfeasances or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the
subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by or
under him, in the discharge of his official duties.
Robertson, 127 U.S. at 515-16.
41 Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 567.
44 Id. at 570.
V, 359 U.S. 297 (1959).
40 Id. at 298. At the time the Court decided Herd, the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act limited the liability of an ocean carrier to a shipper to $500 per package of
cargo or the parallel provisions of the bill of lading. Id. The Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act is currently codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1982). In Herd, the par-
allel provisions of the bill of lading limited liability to $500. Herd, 359 U.S. at 299
n.2.
47 Herd, 359 U.S. at 298. While loading cargo onto the ship, the defendant's
employees dropped a nineteen ton press, owned by the plaintiff, into the harbor.
Id.
48 Id. The district court, however, held that the defendant's negligence caused
the damage to the press. Id. at 299. The United States Supreme Court did not
address the negligence issue.
40 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952) (stevedore,
acting as an agent within his authority, was entitled to claim $500 limitation of
liability provided by the bill of lading).
Herd, 359 U.S. at 300.
51 Id. at 303.
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carrier's liability limitations.52 The Herd opinion also
stated that courts should strictly construe statutory or
contractual liability limitations.53 In summary, the Court
chose to follow precedent stating that an agent cannot
utilize his principal's immunities and limitations. 4
C. Bailment Law
While the interaction between the USPS and Pan Am is
based on agency principles, the relationship between the
USPS and a sender of mail is a bailment contract. 55 Thus,
Pan Am, as an agent of the USPS, is a sub-bailee of a
sender of mail. In a bailment relationship, if the bailee
fails to return or deliver the bailed object as instructed,
the bailor has a prima facie case of negligence against the
bailee.56
The bailment relationship between the Post Office and
52 Id. at 303-05, 308. "From its early history this Court has consistently held
that an agent is liable for all damages caused by his negligence, unless exonerated
therefrom, in whole or in part, by a statute or a valid contract binding on the
person damaged." Id. at 303.
- Id. at 304-05. Statutes limiting liability are in derogation of common law.
Thus, they must be strictly construed so as not to make any alterations upon the
common law which the statute does not fairly express. Id. at 304-05. "Similarly,
contracts purporting to grant immunity from, or limitation of liability must be
strictly construed and limited to intended beneficiaries for they are not to be ap-
plied to familiar rules visiting liability upon a tortfeasor for the consequences of
his negligence, unless the clarity of the language used expresses such to be the
understanding of the contracting parties." Id. at 305 (quoting Boston Metal Co.
v. The Winding Gulf, 349 U.S. 122, 123-24 (1955)).
54 Id. at 308.
5 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 246 F. 433 (9th Cir.
1917). U.S. Fidelity was the surety upon a mail clerk who was accused of stealing
from the mails. The court stated, "It is well settled that the United States is a
bailee for hire of registered packages and their contents and can maintain action
against one who steals such mail and can recover full value of the property taken."
Id. at 435. See also United States v. Nat'l Sur. Corp., 309 U.S. 165, 174 (1940) (in a
suit by private user of mail to recover for consequential damages resulting from
misdelivery of mail, the court recognized that the postal service is considered to
be a bailee of the mail).
.%6 See Picker v. Searcher's Detective Agency, Inc., 515 F.2d 1316, 1317-18 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (detective agency, as the agent of bailee, was not entitled to benefit
from the contractual limitations on the liability of the bailee); I.C.C. Metals, Inc. v.
Mun. Warehouse Co., 50 N.Y.2d 657, 409 N.E.2d 849, 431 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1980)
(where defendant lost the plaintiff's metal which was stored in the defendant's
warehouse, the court held that proof of delivery of stored property to warehouse
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the sender of mail is atypical because the sending of mail
is a government function. Marine Insurance Co. v. United
States58 exemplifies this special relationship. In Marine In-
surance, the United States Court of Claims held that if mail
is lost or damaged, the government's liability is regulated
by law.59 Marine Insurance attempted to recover emeralds
lost in the Mail Division of the United States Customs
Building.60 Because the government confiscated the
emeralds for use in a criminal investigation,6' the plaintiff
claimed the taking an exercise of eminent domain. 2
However, the court held that classifying the taking as an
eminent domain did not circumvent statutory control of
liability in postal matters.6 3 Therefore, the plaintiff was
and its failure to return property upon proper demand suffices to establish a
prima facie case of negligence).
57 See Taylor v. United States Post Office Dep't, 293 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Mo.
1968) (in order to recover for damage to a mailed package, the plaintiff must show
the insurance receipt for the parcel wrapper). See also Twentier v. United States,
109 F. Supp. 406, 408 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (corporation could not recover for the loss of
or damage to a fourth class unprotected package sent to an overseas army post
because the Postmaster General forbade the use of registered, insured or COD
mail to this army post).
- 410 F.2d 764 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
59 Id. at 766. The court stated that "the Government is not liable - assuming
that an implied contract of bailment exists between the Government and a sender
by virtue of a mailing - for loss of or damage to mail, except as may be provided
in the postal laws and regulations." Id. at 765-66. Basically, "the United States is
liable for lost or damaged mail only to the extent it consents to be liable." Ridg-
way Hatcheries, Inc. v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 441, 443 (N.D. Ohio 1968)
(United States was not liable for the death of goslings shipped by mail because the
delivery delays were due to emergency flood conditions).
- Marine Ins., 410 F.2d at 765. The plaintiff, a British insurer, insured a pack-
age containing six emeralds valued at $152,190. The plaintiff intended for the
package to travel by international mail from Geneva, Switzerland to an importer
in New York. The package routinely arrived at the Mail Division of the United
States Custom Building for inspection and the assessment of import duties. Id. at
764-65.
61 Id. Because a number of small valuable packages had recently disappeared
from the Mail Division, Customs officials decided to use the package to trap a
thief. They treated the package with fluorescent powder and then placed it back
in the normal stream of mail. Id. at 765.
(12 Id. at 765. Therefore, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to just com-
pensation. Id.
6- Id. If the plaintiff's classification did circumvent statutory control, a recovery
would be possible where none was ever contemplated. Id. at 766 (quoting
Twentier v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 406, 409 (Ct. Cl. 1953)).
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unable to recover because the statutes granted no relief.64
Marine Insurance illustrates the basic rule that the Postal
Service is only liable for lost or damaged mail to the ex-
tent it consents to liability or as provided in the postal
laws and regulations.65
Prior to Lerakoli, the subject of this note, no American
court had directly addressed whether a sub-bailee could
take advantage of the liability limitations the Universal
Postal Union Convention gives to government functiona-
ries such as the USPS. One court, however, addressed this
issue in dictum in an unpublished opinion. In Caribe Dia-
mond Works, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines,66 the plaintiff mailed
diamonds from Puerto Rico to New York by United States
registered mail, but the diamonds never arrived.6 7 The
court refused to hold the defendant air carrier liable be-
cause the plaintiff failed to prove the defendant's non-de-
livery of the diamonds by a preponderance of the
evidence.68 Though not argued by either side, the court
hypothesized that any liability limitations of the USPS
would apply to any agent of the USPS including air carri-
ers. 69 The district court based its hypothesis on the the-
ory that sub-bailees should enjoy all the original bailee's
liability limits. 70 Because the court offered this discussion
- Id. at 766. There was no relief under the domestic rules because the package
was not governmentally insured or otherwise protected. Additionally, the parcel
post agreement between the United States and Switzerland provides no relief un-
less the parcel is publicly insured. Even if the parcel is publicly insured, the
United States' liability extends only to Switzerland. Id. at 766.
65 Id. at 766. The court's only rationale for this basic rule is "public policy." Id.
No. 71 Civ. 2875 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1974).
67 Id. at slip op. at 1. The plaintiff, a diamond merchant, mailed 147.41 carats
of polished diamonds to a consigner in New York City. The district court held
that the plaintiff had sufficiently proven both the contents of the package and the
receipt of the package by the United States Postal Service at its office in San Juan,
Puerto Rico. Id. at slip op. at 3-5.
- Id. at slip op. at 19. The burden is upon bailor (Caribe Diamond) to show
non-delivery by the bailee (Eastern Airlines), according to the implied agreement
of bailment. The court held that Caribe Diamond failed to prove that the package
of diamonds was stolen at the airport while in Eastern Airlines' control. Id. at slip
op. at 16.
6 Id. at slip op. at 18-19.
,0 Id. at slip op. at 19. "[T]here seems to be no reason why this limitation
should not inure to the benefit of all sub-bailees or successors in interest who
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only in the form of dictum,7 ' it was not binding precedent.
Thus, prior to Lerakoli, no federal court had "officially"
decided this liability limitation issue.
New York courts, however, have examined the agency-
principal question in a general, non-government bailment
context.7 2 One such case is Schoeffer v. United Parcel Services
of New York, 73 which concerned missing furs. The plaintiff
bailed the furs to the John F. Morris Furs, Co. which then
delivered them to UPS, the defendant contract carrier. 4
Subsequently, the furs were either lost or stolen.75 The
bailment agreement between the plaintiff and the fur
company recited the worth of the furs at $3,000.76 UPS
argued that it should be able to limit its liability to
$3,000. 7 7 The court allowed UPS to utilize this liability
limitation because UPS was an agent of the bailee in-
volved in the performance of the bailment agreement.
78
The New York appellate court accepted without explana-
tion the original Restatement's position on agency-princi-
pal liability limitations and held that UPS could use the
fur company's $3,000 liability limitation.79
The New York Court of Appeals also allowed a third
party to utilize a bailee's liability limitation. The third
acquired lawful possession from the original bailee to aid in accomplishing the
purpose of the alleged bailment." Id.
71 Id. "This point was not argued, and... it is unnecessary for us to reach it."
Id.
7 See infra notes 146-151 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
Second Circuit applied these New York cases to Lerakoli.
73 277 A.D. 569, 101 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
74 Id. at 570, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
75 Id.
76 Id. The plaintiff agreed that the value of the furs was $3,000 for the purposes
of pick-up, storage, and delivery. Id.
77 Id. Plaintiff attempted to recover $12,000 for the alleged negligent loss of
the plaintiff's furs by defendant. Id.
78 Id. at 571, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 453. The court stated:
Defendant was not an interloper; it was not a stranger to the contract
of bailment; it was not a tortious third party, indeed it was engaged
in performing the bailment agreement when the furs were stolen
.... An agent who is acting in pursuance of his authority has such
immunities of the principal as are not personal to the principal."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 347 (1933)).
79 Id.
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party in Berger v. 34th Street Garage80 owned a garage. 8'
The plaintiff was an expressman that picked packages up
from shippers and delivered them to carriers for ultimate
delivery outside New York City.82 The expressman regu-
larly left packages at the garage when he was unable to
deliver the packages to the carriers the same day he
picked them up.83 The bailment contract between the ex-
pressman and the shippers limited the expressman's lia-
bility to fifty dollars per shipment. 84  The expressman
sued the garageman when the packages were stolen out of
the garage.8 5 The court allowed the garageman to limit
his liability because he was an ad hoc agent of the parties
to the bailment and not simply an interloper or a stran-
ger. 86 The court explicitly accepted the original Restate-
ment's position of allowing an agent to utilize its
principal's liability limitations.87 Thus, New York courts
seem to follow the original Restatement's positions in
bailment contexts.
so 3 N.Y.2d 701, 148 N.E.2d 883, 171 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1958).
s, Id. at 703, 148 N.E.2d at 884, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
82 Id. at 703, 148 N.E.2d at 884, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
83 Id. On the day in question, the plaintiff picked up 55 packages from six dif-
ferent shippers. Because it was too late in the day to make delivery to the carrier's
terminals, the plaintiff stored the truck and packages in the defendant's garage
overnight. Id. At the trial, there was evidence establishing that the shippers knew
of this practice and did not object. Id.
- Id. at 703, 148 N.E.2d at 884, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 825. The record does not
indicate how the parties to the contract arrived at the fifty dollar liability
limitation.
85 Id. The plaintiff brought the suit on "behalf of the owners of the goods as
bailee of the cargo." Id.
86 Id. at 703, 148 N.E.2d at 884, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
Upon such a showing, the defendant garageman was not an inter-
loper or stranger to the original bailment, but was in truth and fact
the plaintiff's chosen representative authorized to discharge for the
time being their own responsibilities to the original bailor. Such be-
ing the fact, the garageman became an agent ad hoc and, while acting
pursuant to his authority, was entitled to "such immunities of the
principal as are not personal to the principal" which, in this instance,
was the limited liability as fixed in the original shipping documents.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 347 (1933)).
87 Id. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the judgment of the trial
court limiting the garageman's liability. Id.
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D. The Lausanne Convention
The postal laws and regulations give the Postal Service
the authority to negotiate postal treaties and conven-
tions. 88 Though universal postal conventions and univer-
sal conventions in general are not treaties, they carry the
same weight as law.89 The aim of these conventions is the
uniformity of legal rules within the participating coun-
tries.90 An international convention should be inter-
preted by the plain and obvious meaning rule absent a
clear indication that the parties intend otherwise. 91
88 39 U.S.C. § 407 (1982), provides that:
(a) The Postal Service, with the consent of the President, may nego-
tiate and conclude postal treaties or conventions, and may establish
the rates of postage or other charges on mail matter conveyed be-
tween the United States and other countries. The decisions of the
Postal Service construing or interpreting the provisions of any treaty
or convention which has been or may be negotiated and concluded
shall, if approved by the President, be conclusive upon all officers of
the Government of the United States.
(b) The Postal Service shall transmit a copy of each postal conven-
tion concluded with other governments to the Secretary of State,
who shall furnish a copy of the same to the Public Printer for
publication.
89 Four Packages of Cut Diamonds v. United States, 256 F. 305, 306 (2d Cir.
1919) (in an action to determine if a package sent by registered mail from Cuba to
the United States distinctly marked 'loose diamonds, dutiable' was part of a smug-
gling ring, the court interpreted a universal postal convention between Cuba and
the United States). "Such conventions [universal postal conventions] are not trea-
ties, because they are not made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and they are not laws, because not enacted by Congress .... [W]e assume that as
administrative regulations made by authority of Congress they have the force of
law." Id. See also Williams v. Blount, 314 F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (D.D.C. 1970) (in a
class action for injunction restraining the Postmaster General from impounding
an issue of a newsletter sent from China, the court chose not to rely on the Uni-
versal Postal Union Convention). The Court of Claims in Standard Fruit & S.S.
Co. v. United States, 103 Ct. Cl. 659, 682 (1945), a dispute as to whether the
United States owed a Delaware corporation payment for the carriage of mail,
stated: "[A convention] has the same force and effect as any other regulation
issued by the Postmaster General under authority of law." Standard Fruit, 103 Ct.
Cl. at 682.
w, Munday, The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions, 27 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 450, 450 (1978) (examined the problem of conflicting national inter-
pretations of uniform conventions in the context of a recent English case -James
Buchana & Co. Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping (U.K.) Ltd., [1977] Q.B. 208
(C.A.); [19781 A.C. 141 (H.L.)).
- Airline Pilots Assoc., Int'l, AFL-CIO v. TACA Int'l Airlines, 748 F.2d 965,
969 (5th Cir. 1984) (in an appeal from an order permanently barring the defend-
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The Universal Postal Union adopted the section of the
Universal Postal Union Convention dealing with liability
limitations on July 5, 1974, at Lausanne.92 This section is
known as the Lausanne Convention.93 Article 44 of the
Lausanne Convention sets forth the extent of the liability
existing upon postal administrations. 94 This article limits
a postal administration's liability to only registered
items.95 More importantly, a postal administration is only
required to pay 40 francs for each registered item that is
lost. 96
One open question in relation to Article 44 was
ant, an El Salvadoran airline, from relocating its pilot base and changing the em-
ployment terms of its pilot employees, the court interpreted the Air
Transportation Agreement between the United States and El Salvador). See also
Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (Court interpreted the Income
Tax Convention in determining whether an American trust is subject to income
tax).
The plain meaning rule precludes the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the
meaning of a statute if the statute's language seems clear on its face. Ukpeagvik
Inupiat Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (D. Alaska
1981). Moreover, the plain meaning rule of statutory construction authorizes that
words of a statute have the same meaning to those who authorized the statute and
to those who read the statute. People v. Gilbert, 414 Mich. 191, 324 N.W. 834,
838 (1982).
92 Universal Postal Union Convention, done July 5, 1974, Additional Protocol,
27 U.S.T. 345, 348 T.I.A.S. No. 8231 [hereinafter Lausanne Convention].
The purpose of the Postal Union is to develop "communications between peo-
ples by the efficient operation of the postal services, and to contribut[e] to the
attainment of the noble aims of international collaboration in the cultural, social
and economic fields .. " 27 U.S.T. at 786. The scope and objectives of the
Convention are found in Article One of the Constitution of the Universal Postal
Union. They include:
1. The countries adopting this Constitution comprise, under the
title of the Universal Postal Union, a single postal territory for the
reciprocal exchange of letter-post items. Freedom of transit is guar-
anteed throughout the entire territory of the Union. 2. The aim of
the Union is to secure the organization and improvement of the pos-
tal services and to promote in this sphere the development of inter-
national collaboration. 3. The Union shall take part, as far as
possible, in postal technical assistance sought by its member
countries.
27 U.S.T. at 786.
us 27 U.S.T. at 348.
1 27 U.S.T. at 396.
9. Id.
" Id. This amount may be raised to 200 francs per special bag of printed pa-
pers as defined therein. Id.
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whether the liability limitations provided for in the Article
applied to agents of the postal administration. Answering
this question required interpreting the Lausanne Conven-
tion.97 Prior to Lerakoli, no court had attempted such an
interpretation.gS
E. Related Decisions by the English Courts
Previously, the English court system addressed the lia-
bility issue as it relates to the postal system and air carri-
ers. In Moukataffv. British Overseas Airways, the plaintiff lost
currency carried in a mail sack.99 The defendant mail car-
rier, British Overseas Airways (BOA), argued that the
postal service's liability limitations should apply to it.'00
The court ruled that there was nothing present in the
English statutes which allowed an agent of the Post Office
to share the Post Office's liability limitations. 0 ' Conse-
quently, the court held BOA fully liable to the plaintiff.1
0 2
97 International agreements have the same force and effect as domestic statu-
tory law. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Therefore, courts should in-
terpret these agreements according to statutory rules of construction. Rucker v.
Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1969) (in an action for personal injuries
resulting from a train-automobile collision, the court interpreted a regulation
promulgated by the Illinois Commerce Commission). A basic rule of statutory
construction is that statutes in derogation of common law rights are to be strictly
construed. Checkrite Petroleum, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 678 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (court interpreted the Petroleum Marketing Prac-
tices Act in a contract dispute between a corporation and an oil company); Bauers
v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (court inter-
preted the Civil Rights Act in an action against the county prosecutor for alleged
denial of civil rights).
'i" See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Caribe Dia-
mond which addressed this issue in dictum.





There is nothing strange about a person being liable for his own
fault, even if some other person has by contract successfully ex-
cluded his liability for the same damage or loss, especially if the lat-
ter was not personally at fault .... I have come to the conclusion that
there is a complete and exhaustive statutory code regulating the
rights and liability of everyone concerned with the sending and car-
riage of the mail. Apart from Sec. 9(1) of the Crown Proceedings
Act, all the statutory provisions are dealing, and dealing only, with
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Thus, without specific statutory authority, the English
courts were unwilling to expand the application of liability
limitations to include agents of the Post Office.10 3
Soon after the court decided Moukataff, the Parliament
passed the Post Office Act. 0 4 Section 29(3) of this Act
provides that carriers of the mail and their agents may
take advantage of the Post Office's liability limitations.0 5
Subsequently, an English court decided American Express
Co. v. British Airways Board.'0 6  In American Express, the
plaintiff filed a claim against a mail carrier.10 7 The court
dismissed the claim because the Post Office Act explicitly
relieved the mail carrier from liability.'0 8 American Express
demonstrates that after the passage of the Post Office Act,
the English courts allowed the air carriers, as agents and
independent contractors of the English Post Office, to
utilize liability limitations because the carriers' arguments
were based on statutory grounds.
F. An Analogy to the Warsaw Convention
Unlike the British court system, the United States
the liability of the Crown or the Postmaster-General or the Post Of-
fice, and do not purport to deal with those of anyone else. Section
9(1) deals also with the liabilities of "Officer of the Crown" and ex-
cludes their liability to senders of letters; but if I am right in my view
that "Officer of the Crown" does not include independent contrac-
tors, the latter are excluded from the protection of the sub-section,
presumably deliberately, and it cannot be said that any complete
statutory code exists, because independent contractors (and any




-4 Post Office Act, 1969.
,o, Post Office Act § 29(3) states:
No person engaged in or about the carriage of mail and no officer,
servant, agent or subcontractor of such person shall be subject ex-
cept at the suit of the Post Office to any civil liability for any loss of
damage in the case of which liability of the Post Office therefore is
excluded by subsection (1) of this section.
Id.
lot American Express Co. v. British Airways Bd., [1983] 1 W.L.R. 701 (Q.B.).
107 Id.
IOs Id.
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courts, prior to Lerakoli, had not explicitly addressed the
mail carrier-Post Office liability limitation issue. How-
ever, the American courts have examined this liability lim-
itation issue in a different context: the liability limitations
contained in the Warsaw Convention. 0 9 This Convention
regulates the international air transportation of persons,
baggage, and goods."l 0 Article 22 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion expressly limits an air carrier's liability for the injury
or death of the passengers and for the damage or destruc-
tion of baggage or other goods."I In recent years, courts
have allowed employees and agents of the air carriers to
also take advantage of these liability limitations.' 1 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit faced the Warsaw Convention limitation issue in Reed
v. Wiser.' 13 The plaintiffs in Reed were the personal repre-
sentatives, heirs, and next of kin of nine airline passengers
killed when a bomb exploded on a Trans World Airlines
airplane. 11 4 Rather than suing TWA, the plaintiffs filed
suit against certain officers of the corporation. 1' 5 The
og The formal title of the Warsaw Convention is the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for
signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. See generally DeVivo,
The Warsaw Convention: Judical Tolling of the Death Knell, 49 J. AIR L. & CoM. 71
(1983); Haskell, The Warsaw System & The U.S. Constitution Revisited, 39J. AIR L. &
COM. 483 (1973);Johnson & Minch, The Warsaw Convention Before the Supreme Court:
Preserving the Integrity of the System, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 93 (1986).
1,o Warsaw Convention, supra note 109.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 109, art. 22. Article 22 provides:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodic pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id.
"I2 See infra notes 113-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases deal-
ing with the liability limitation issue and the Warsaw Convention.
- 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
114 Id. at 1079-8 1. On September 8, 1974, the flight from Tel Aviv to New York
crashed into the sea fifty nautical miles west of Cephalonia, Greece. All 79 pas-
sengers and nine crew members on board died. Id. at 1081.
115 Id. at 1081. The Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agree-
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court addressed the question of whether the liability limi-
tations contained in the Warsaw Convention extended to
employees of the airlines. Because Reed was the first fed-
eral appellate case dealing with this particular issue,' 16 the
court performed an in-depth analysis of the Warsaw Con-
vention and its legislative history." 7 The Second Circuit
held that the employees could utilize the Convention's lia-
bility limitations."" The appellate court based its holding
on the plain language meaning of the Warsaw Convention
in its French-text form.1 9 In addition, the court's exami-
nation of the legislative history of the agreement revealed
that some of the drafters intended for the limitations to
protect not only the air carrier, but also its servants or
agents.12 0 Thus, the plaintiffs in Reed could not recover an
amount from the defendant officers in excess of the liabil-
ity limitations set forth in the Warsaw Convention.' 2'
A New York appellate court adopted the Reed reasoning
for the first time in Julius Young Jewelry Manufacturing Co. v.
Delta Air Lines. 122 In Julius Young, the plaintiff lost baggage
containing jewelry during a flight from the Bahamas,
ment, limits TWA's liability to $75,000 per passenger, unless plaintiff could show
willful misconduct. Id. at 1081. Instead, the plaintiffs sued the President of TWA
and the Vice-President of Audit and Security of TWA, alleging that the defendants
were responsible for security on TWA flights and acted negligently in regards to
this particular flight's security. Id.
-; Id. at 1081-82. The American trial courts addressing the issue split in their
holdings. Compare Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 152 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D.N.J. 1957)
(employees not protected) with Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 132 F.
Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (agents protected).
,,7 Id. at 1082-93. See infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text for details of
the analysis.
- Reed, 555 F.2d at 1093. "Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs may not re-
cover from an air carrier's employees or from the carrier and its employees to-
gether a sum greater than that recoverable in a suit against the carrier itself as
limited by the Warsaw Convention with its applicable agreements and protocols."
Id.
I Id. at 1087. The disputed French terms were "transporteur" (carrier) and
"cas" (events or cases). Id. at 1083-84.
12-. Id. at 1083-87. The court relied on both minutes from previous conventions
and outside articles written by delegates to the conventions. Id.
121 Id. at 1093.
122 67 A.D.2d 148, 414 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
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through New York City to Bermuda.' 23  The plaintiff
sought recovery from both Delta Air Lines (Delta) and Al-
lied Aviation Service (Allied), an independent contractor
that handled Delta'. baggage transfers.' 24 Allied argued
that, as an agent of Delta, it should be allowed to utilize
the liability limitations provided to Delta by the Warsaw
Convention.' 2 5 The defendant cited Reed 126 in support of
its argument. 27 Finding no reason to deviate from Reed,
the state appellate court accepted Allied's position and al-
lowed Allied to limit its liability through the Warsaw Con-
vention.' 28 The court explained its holding by stating that
any other decision would be unfair to the agent working
for the air carrier and would contradict the purposes of
the Warsaw Convention. 29 It is interesting to note that
the Julius Young court expanded the Reed theory by al-
lowing an independent contractor of the air carrier, not
simply an employee of the air carrier, to utilize the liability
limitations.' 3 0
Baker v. Lansdell Protective Agency ' 3 1 is similar to Julius
Young' 32 in that it also involves an independent contrac-
tor. Baker instituted the action to recover the value of
123 Julius Young, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 529. The jewelry was valued at $55,000. Id.
124 Id. The plaintiffs sought a recovery of $55,000. Id. at 528.
1- Id. at 529. "As an agent for the carriers, Allied contends it is merely an
extension of the corporate enterprise and performs an enterprise function, a ser-
vice each carrier itself would have to provide by its own employees." Id.
26 See supra notes 113-121 and accompanying text for a discussion of Reed.
127 Julius Young, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 529. Recognizing that the Reed holding applied
only to employees or servants of the air carriers, Allied argued that the Reed ra-
tionale could readily be extended to agents of the air carrier. Id.
1211 Id. at 530. "Nor do we see a sufficient basis for departing from the principle
of the Reed case .... Accordingly, we hold that the liability limitations of the Con-
vention apply to an air carrier's agent performing functions the carrier could or
would, as here, otherwise perform itself." Id.
120 Id. "To allow an agent such as Allied, which is performing services in fur-
therance of the contract of carriage, and in place of the carriers themselves, to be
liable without limit would circumvent the Convention's purposes of providing
uniform worldwide liability rules and definite limits to the carriers' obligations."
Id.
1,,, Id.
121 590 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
12 See supra notes 122-130 and accompanying text for a discussion of Julius
Young.
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jewelry allegedly stolen from her hand luggage during a
security check prior to boarding a British Airways flight
from New York to London.' 33 The employees of the de-
fendant, Lansdell Protective Agency, performed the
check.' 3 4 Relying on Reed and Julius Young, the protective
agency sought to limit its liability under the Warsaw Con-
vention because it was an agent of British Airways.13 5 In
accepting this argument, the district court noted that ex-
isting statutes required security checks to be performed
by agents of the air carriers. 36 Thus, as an agent of Brit-
ish Airways, the defendant fell squarely within the protec-
tion of the Warsaw Convention as interpreted by the Reed
and Julius Young courts. 13 7 Therefore, the court limited
Baker's recovery from the protective agency. 38
133 Baker, 590 F. Supp. at 167. Baker alleges that approximately $200,000 worth
of jewelry disappeared from her bag between the time she handed the bag to a
security agent for passage though an X-ray scanner and the time the bag was re-
turned to her on the other side of the screening area. Id.
13 Id. British Airways contracted with Lansdell to perform the security checks.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 170.
36 Id. See also 49 U.S.C. app. § 1356(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), which requires
that:
The Administrator shall prescribe or continue in effect reasonable
regulations requiring that all passengers and all property intended
to be carried in the aircraft cabin in air transportation or intrastate
air transportation be screened by weapon-detecting procedures or
facilities employed or operated by employees or agents of the air
carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier prior to boarding
the aircraft for such transportation. ...
Id.
1"7 Baker, 590 F. Supp. at 170. The plaintiff argued that she needed additional
information about the nature of the relationship between Lansdell and British Air-
ways. The court, however, was convinced that Lansdell was an agent of the air-
line. Id. at 170-71.
I" d. at 171. The court held:
Accordingly .... Lansdell's motion for partial summary judgment
limiting its liability to $400 is granted subject to plaintiff's opportu-
nity to demonstrate at trial that her loss occurred as a result of Lan-
sdell's willful misconduct or of the willful misconduct of one of
Lansdell's employees acting within the scope of his employment.
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II. LERAKOLI, INC. V. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not
use the traditional process of examining case law in decid-
ing Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways."3 9 Instead,
the Second Circuit stressed the practical implications of
its holding.' 40 The significance of these practical implica-
tions, according to the court, outweighed the need to spe-
cifically follow precedent.
Initially, the court examined the Lausanne Conven-
tion's liability limitations. 14 1 The Second Circuit then rec-
ognized that no federal court had directly addressed the
extent of these liability limitations. 142 However, it noted
the Caribe Diamond decision and that court's analysis,
though in dictum, of the liability issue. 143 The Lerakoli
court accepted without explanation the reasoning set
forth in Caribe Diamond which hypothesized that any liabil-
ity limitations of the USPS would apply to any agent of the
USPS. 1 4 4 Because the facts of the two cases were so simi-
lar, the court's acceptance of the reasoning is not
surprising. 145
Next, the Second Circuit discussed the bailment rela-
tionship between the USPS, Pan Am, and the sender of
mail. 146 The court relied on two New York cases, Berger v.
34th Street Garage 147 and Schoeffer v. United Parcel Service of
,sg 783 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986).
140 Id. at 36-37. See infra notes 156-163 and accompanying text for the court's
discussion of the practical aspects of its holding. See also infra notes 181-184 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the practical implications of Lerakoli.
1' See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lau-
sanne Convention.
142 Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 35. "Application of this liability provision to a carrier
performing services for a postal administration has not yet been squarely ad-
dressed by the federal courts." Id.
143 Id. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text for an analysis of Caribe
Diamond.
14 Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36. The court simply stated: "We agree with the rea-
soning in Caribe .... " Id.
145 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lerakoli
facts. See also supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text for the facts of Caribe
Diamond.
140 Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36.
'14 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Berger.
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New York,' 48 in holding that a sub-bailee can utilize the lia-
bility limitations of the bailor and bailee.' 49 The appel-
lants argued that these two cases were distinguishable
from Lerakoli because they contained express contractual
liability limitations which Lerakoli did not.5 0 The Second
Circuit overcame this distinction by deciding that the
terms of the Lausanne Convention constituted a contrac-
tual agreement. '5 '
The appellate court continued its opinion by analogiz-
ing the Lausanne Convention to the Warsaw Conven-
tion.' 5 2  Courts have held that the liability limitations
contained in the Warsaw Convention apply not only to
the air carriers, but also to the employees and agents of
the air carriers. 5 3 The Second Circuit ruled that the same
reasoning made an expansion of the Lausanne Conven-
tion's liability limitations appropriate. 5' Because the
wording of the liability limitations of the two conventions
is similar, it is not surprising that the court borrowed the
148 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schoeffer.
149 Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36. "It is established common law doctrine that a sub-
bailee may take advantage of a liability limitation contractually agreed upon be-
tween the original bailee and bailor." Id.
10 Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2-3, Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan American
World Airways, 783 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-7503)[hereinafter Appellant's
Reply Brief]. Lerakoli argued:
Berger and Schoeffer are distinguishable from the present action be-
cause those cases involved limitations of liability to which the plain-
tiffs had agreed as a matter of contract. By contrast, in the matter at
hand the only limitation that has been mentioned is that contained
in Article 44 of the Lausanne Convention.
Id.
1.'1 Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36. "These terms [of the Lausanne Convention] form
the equivalent of a contractual agreement between the sender and the USPS limit-
ing the liability of the USPS, and, pursuant to agency principles, that limitation is
passed on to any party performing services for the USPS." Id.
1.52 Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36. See supra notes 109-138 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Warsaw Convention.
"- See supra notes 112-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases
expanding the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations.
- Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36. "In addition, application of Article 44 to Pan Am is
appropriate in light of the reasoning of this and other courts in decisions holding
that the liability limitations for air carriers under the Warsaw Convention should
be extended to employees and agents of such carriers." Id.
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reasoning from the Warsaw Convention cases. 155
The proponents behind the expansion of the Warsaw
Convention's liability limits argued that a practical chaos
would result if the liability limitations did not include
agents.' 56 The same argument, in the context of the Lau-
sanne Convention, dominates the majority of the Second
Circuit's time in Lerakoli.' 57 The court predicted that if
the liability limitations of the Lausanne Convention did
not apply to air carriers, the USPS's air mail program
would be jeopardized. 58 In order to salvage the program,
the USPS might be forced to raise postage fees' 59 which
would directly affect the consumers.' 60 According to the
court, such an increase would contradict the central pur-
pose behind Article 44 of the Lausanne Convention: limit-
ing the financial burden of international mail carriage on
the postal system.'16
Along with its concern about the effects on the USPS
and the consumers, the court considered the air carriers'
position. The air carriers are performing USPS's respon-
sibilities. 162 In all fairness, the court opined, they should
,5- Compare Warsaw Convention, art. 22, supra note 111 with Lausanne Conven-
tion, supra note 92, art. 44, at 396 which provides that:
1. Postal administrations shall be liable only for the loss of regis-
tered items....
3. In case of loss of a registered letter, the sender shall be entitled
to an indemnity the amount of which shall be fixed at 40 francs per
item;....
156 See supra notes 112-138 and accompanying text.
157 Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36. After discussing the practical implications of the
Warsaw Convention cases, the court determined that "[t]he implications of failing
to extend the Lausanne Convention provision to agents of the USPS are no less
severe." id.
- Id. The inability of the air carriers to utilize the USPS's liability limitations
"would have a major influence on the USPS's ability to contract with airlines for
the carriage of mail in the future." Id.
9,, Id.
,1-, Id. "At the very least, air carriers would demand higher rates from the USPS
for this service, with such added government costs then being passed on to the
public in the form of higher postage prices." Id.
l Id. at 36-37.
16 See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of mail carriage
procedures.
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likewise be able to utilize USPS's liability limitations. 63
While the Lerakoli court carefully analyzed the practical-
ities of this case, it failed to consider other relevant argu-
ments and case law. For example, the court did not cite
one case dealing with agency law. '4 Notably absent from
the appellate court's opinion is an analysis of the princi-
ples contained in Sloan Shipyards and Herd which held that
an agent may not share his principal's immunities and lia-
bility limitations unless allowed by statute or valid con-
tract.' 65 Possibly the court omitted these decisions
because they appear to contradict the Lerakoli holding. 66
The Lerakoli case involved neither a statute nor a valid
contract. 167 (While the court attempted to characterize the
terms of the Lausanne Convention as a contractual ar-
rangement, it cited no authority for such an analogy.) 168
Thus, according to the Sloan Shipyards and Herd cases, the
USPS's liability limitations should not apply to Pan Am.
However, the Second Circuit failed to address these im-
portant precedents.
Another relevant area that the court did not discuss in
its opinion was statutory interpretation.'6 9 It has been
held that courts should strictly construe an international
convention that is in derogation of common law rights. 70
Thus, the Lerakoli court should have strictly interpreted
Article 44 of the Lausanne Convention. It did not do this.
Instead, the court chose a broader interpretation by al-
lowing agents of the USPS to share the liability limitations
-., Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36. "It would be unjust indeed to require air carriers, as
a condition of their operation, to perform services otherwise the responsibility of
the USPS while at the same time denying them the benefit of the USPS's liability
limitations." Id.
' See supra notes 23-54 and accompanying text for a summary of agency law.
". See supra notes 31-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sloan Ship-
yards and Herd.
..... Compare Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 37 with Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 567 and Herd,
359 U.S. at 303.
... Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 33-37.
1- Id. at 36.
See supra note 97 for a discussion on construing international conventions.
17,. Id.
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contained in the Article.1 7 1  The Lerakoli court not only
chose to ignore the rules of statutory construction, but it
also decided not to directly consider this issue. 72 Rather,
in a footnote the appellate court wrote that applying the
rules of statutory construction would result in an unfavor-
able holding. 173 The manner in which the court dealt with
the statutory construction issue is another illustration of
the court's preoccupation with the practical effects of its
decision.
The Lerakoli court dealt with another issue in a similar
manner. In its brief, Lerakoli argued that Pan Am was an
independent contractor for the United States govern-
ment. 74 Thus, according to the appellants, the body of
law dealing with independent contractors governed this
17, Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36-37.
172 Id. at 37 n.7.
173 Id.
As to the limitations of statutory construction, a more restrictive ap-
proach than the one which we now take would not only affect Pan
Am and other carriers, but, as we have stated, also would impact
upon the USPS in the long term. The interpretation which Lerakoli
would have us adopt, therefore, would be in direct contravention of
the underlying intent of Article 44.
Id.
Lerakoli argued that the "significant point about... [Article 44 ofn the Conven-
tion is that it does not mention postal administrations and carriers, but only postal
administrations. By including independent contractors such as Pan Am within the
scope of the Convention's coverage, Pan Am and the district court amend the
treaty language." Brief for Appellant at 16, Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan American World
Airways, 783 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-7503) [hereinafter Appellant's Briefn.
174 Appellant's Brief at 18-19.
The second difficulty with Pan Am's position is that it violates estab-
lished principles concerning the liability of independent contractors
doing work for the government. See generally, [sic] In re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1053-58 (E.D.N.Y.
1980) and 506 F. Supp. 762, 792-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); ... While in-
dependent contractors may be immune while performing work for
the Government, see [sic] McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 704
F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), this immunity is not applicable when the
work has been done negligently or in an intentionally wrongful way.
See Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14
(9th Cir. 1961); Green v. IC.I. America, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1265
(E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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case.' 75 The Second Circuit, however, quickly dismissed
this contention in a footnote without any explanation. t7
6
Likewise, the Lerakoli court ignored foreign court rul-
ings on similar issues. 177 Because the Lausanne Conven-
tion is international in scope, the appellants decided that
an analogy to similar English court cases was relevant to
Lerakoli.'7 " The court, however, apparently disagreed and
did not even note this argument in its opinion.17 9
In summary, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that the liability limitations of the Lausanne
Convention apply not only to the USPS, but also to the air
carriers which carry mail for the USPS. Throughout its
decision, the Lerakoli court stressed the disastrous effects
of a contrary holding.'i 0 Thus, in the court's opinion, no
other decision was possible.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
RULING
The Lerakoli holding will effect the United States Postal
Service, air carriers, and the public. In addition, the sta-
tus of the relevant case law is unclear as a result of this
ruling. Finally, the Second Circuit did not follow a tradi-
tional analytical approach in examining Lerakoli.
A major effect of the Lerakoli decision on the USPS is to
ensure its continued ability to obtain carriers for overseas
mail. If the court had refused to allow the agents to utilize
the limitations, the USPS would have faced a distressing
situation. Those air carriers that transport mail under
specific contract with the USPS would probably not ex-
17 Appellant's Brief, supra note 173, at 18-19.
I- Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 37 n.7. "Lerakoli's contentions relating to .. .princi-
ples governing the liability of independent contractors who deal with the govern-
ment, are meritless .... As to the principles governing independent contractors,
such cases, which deal with issues of sovereign immunity, have little application
here." Id.
177 See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the English
court system's analysis of the liability issue in a similar context to Lerakoli.
I'm Appellant's Brief, supra note 173, at 21-23.
,7, Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 36-37.
18() Id.
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tend their contracts for additional terms because the risk
of liability would be too great. 18 ' With the Lerakoli deci-
sion, the Second Circuit has assured the USPS that the
future of its foreign air mail program is secure.
The Second Circuit's decision in Lerakoli is also a major
victory for all air carriers who transport mail for the
USPS. The monetary difference between paying the full
value for a lost registered mail item and the reduced value
set by the Lausanne Convention can be great. (For exam-
ple, the respective values in this case were $4.8 million as
opposed to $173.36).182 Obviously, the Lerakoli decision
pleases the air carriers.
An additional group affected by this holding is the ordi-
nary USPS patron - the public. From whom is the ordi-
nary citizen supposed to recover if his registered foreign
postal shipment is lost? The Lausanne Convention effec-
tively limited the liability of the USPS. Lerakoli has limited
the liability of the air carriers. Thus, a plaintiff has no re-
covery options other than private insurance. While the
majority of individuals are probably already obtaining in-
surance, Lerakoli transforms insurance from an option to a
practical requirement. 8 3 The Lerakoli decision concur-
rently pleases and distresses insurance companies which
insure overseas shipments. On one hand, because postal
patrons must obtain insurance to guarantee a full recov-
ery in case of loss, insurance business on overseas ship-
ments should increase. On the other hand, Lerakoli
imposes a severe burden on insurance companies because
they will bear the financial loss of the air carriers' limited
liability. Though an insured individual will obtain full re-
covery of his loss from the insurance company, the insur-
38, See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
182 Appellant's Brief, supra note 173, at 2.
18- The appellants' briefs do not include any details as to whether the plaintiff
privately insured the packages or, if insured, whether it recovered on the insur-
ance policy. Appellant's Brief, supra note 173; Appellant's Reply Brief supra note
150. According to the appellant, the USPS does not offer insurance on interna-
tional mail. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 150, at 4. Surprisingly, the Sec-
ond Circuit did not address this insurance issue. Lerakoli, 783 F.2d at 33-36.
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ance company's recovery is limited by Lerakoli. Therefore,
by insuring overseas shipments, an insurance company as-
sumes a great financial risk. In order to counteract this
financial risk, it is possible that insurance companies will
enact stricter guidelines for overseas shipments. These
stricter guidelines will be detrimental to the USPS patron
seeking insurance. Thus, Lerakoli does have negative im-
plications for both insurance companies and the public.
The major effect of this case on the relevant case law
relates to the Sloan Shipyards and Herd cases.' 84 The Ler-
akoli court apparently decided this case without regard to
these United State Supreme Court holdings. Surpris-
ingly, the appellate court did not even discuss the Sloan
Shipyards and Herd decisions in its opinion. Future courts
must either (1) limit the Sloan Shipyards and Herd prece-
dents or limit Lerakoli itself; (2) affirm Lerakoli and vacate
Sloan Shipyards and Herd; or (3) reverse Lerakoli.'85
Finally, while this decision makes practical sense, the
Second Circuit did not decide it on the basis of precedent.
The American legal system is based on the principle that
lower courts should follow higher court decisions and dis-
sent from them only after showing good cause. In Ler-
akoli, though good cause for dissent was arguably present,
the Second Circuit never officially dissented from the rele-
vant United States Supreme Court opinions such as Sloan
Shipyards and Herd. Instead, the court chose to ignore
these case holdings and decide Lerakoli on practical
grounds. If all courts decided cases in this manner, the
present American system of following precedent would be
effectively circumvented.
184 See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sloan Ship-
yards. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Herd. See
supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lerakoli in relation
to Sloan Shipyards and Herd.
185 The United States Supreme Court declined to review the Lerakoli holding.
Lerakoli, 55 U.S.L.W. 3232 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1986) (No. 85-2109).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The decision limiting the liability of air carriers acting
as agents for the USPS creates two unsettled issues. The
first question relates to the status of agency law. Under
what circumstances an agent may share his principal's lia-
bility limitations is an open question. The current trend is
toward allowing the agent to utilize his principal's immu-
nities. This position justifiably benefits the agent. Unfor-
tunately, until the courts clarify the status of agency law,
an agent is not guaranteed this benefit. Such uncertainty
works to the disadvantage of the parties involved. The
courts must resolve the status of agency law in relation to
the principal's liability limitations in order to bring clarity
and consistency to the case law in this area. The second
and more important question created by Lerakoli concerns
the future of the overseas mail shipment program. As
previously discussed, Lerakoli severely hampers an insur-
ance company's ability to fully recover for a lost USPS
registered mail shipment. As a result, the insurance com-
pany may impose more stringent requirements on the in-
dividual mailing the overseas shipment. These stricter
requirements could deter many individuals from mailing
packages overseas. Thus, the Second Circuit's decision
may result in a restricted use of the postal services. De-
pending on the degree of restricted use, the role of the
USPS in overseas shipping may be so severely reduced as
to recharacterize the USPS as a whole. In the end, a USPS
air carrier's ability to limit its liability may become insig-
nificant because individuals who cannot obtain insurance
will cease to use the USPS in mailing packages overseas.




TORTS - CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY - State law
governs third-party claims by the United States for contri-
bution from other defendants in aviation tort cases. Over-
seas National Airways, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1985).
On November 12, 1975, an Overseas National Airways
(Overseas) jet crash-landed shortly after takeoff from John
F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York when
its engines ingested a number of seagulls.I The pilot
safely stopped the aircraft on the runway and the passen-
gers and crew deplaned without injury.2 However, a fire
resulting from the ingestion of the seagulls destroyed the
jet and its contents.' Overseas and Bank of America,
owner of the jet, filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) was negligent in
certifying the plane's engines, in certifying the airport,
and in clearing the plane for takeoff.5 The United States
filed a third-party action against the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey (Port Authority), the entity that
operates JFK, and against the City of New York (City), op-
erator of two landfills near the airport.6
The Port Authority had used a bird control program at
Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.2d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1985).
2 Id. at 99.
, Id.
4 Id. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1982).
5 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 99. Congress delegated sweeping authority to the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration to provide for safety in air commerce and to prevent
aviation accidents. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1432 (1982). An airport is eligible for
certification if the FAA "after investigation, finds that the applicant is properly
and adequately equipped and able to conduct a safe operation in accordance with
this part, and approved the airport operations manual submitted with and incor-
porated in the application." 14 C.F.R. § 139.11(b) (1986).
6 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 99.
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JFK to reduce the risk of accidents.7 The United States
claimed that the Port Authority had negligently operated
the program and sought contribution and indemnity in
the event the court ultimately held the FAA liable for the
damages." The landfills operated by the City attracted a
large number of seagulls. 9 The United States alleged that
the City operated the landfills negligently thereby at-
tracting the seagulls which caused the accident.' 0 The
City, therefore, was liable for contribution and indem-
nity.' The Port Authority thereafter filed a third-party
complaint against the City.' 2
Overseas also filed suit against the Port Authority and
the City in the New York state courts stating that the par-
ties were liable in the same manner as the United States
claimed in the federal action.' 3 The defendants cross-
claimed for contribution and indemnity against one an-
other.' 4 In 1983 the state court approved a settlement in-
cluding the non-defendant United States, the Port
Authority, and Overseas. 15 The City, although a defend-
" Id. A requirement for preparation of an airport operations manual is that an
applicant "must show that it has established instructions and procedures for the
prevention or removal of factors on the airport that attract, or may attract, birds."
14 C.F.R. § 139.67 (1986).
8 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 99.
9 Id.
10 Id. Federal regulations governing sanitary landfills specifically provide that
"The site should not be located in an area where the attraction of birds would
pose a hazard to low flying aircraft." 40 C.F.R. § 241.202-2(e) (1986). Regula-
tions further provide "All airports within the vicinity of the site should be identi-
fied to aid in assessing the potential hazard of birds to aircraft." 40 C.F.R.
§ 241.203-2(b)(2) (1986). In 1976 the FAA met with the City to call the City's
attention to the bird hazard caused by the dump and suggested the use of shotgun
patrols, shredders, covering the garbage or relocating the sites to correct the
problem. Brief for Appellant at 8, Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. United States,
766 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1985).
, Overseas, 766 F.2d at 99.
12 Id.
1S Id. The United States was not included in the state suit because jurisdiction
under the Federal Tort Claims Act is vested exclusively in the federal courts.
Neither a suit against the United States nor one of its employees, acting within the
scope of his employment, may be maintained in a state court. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2679(d) (1982).
14 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 99.
I. Id. The United States paid three million dollars in the settlement. Brief for
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ant, did not participate in the settlement. 16 The final order
of the court dismissed all claims with prejudice.' 7 How-
ever, the order stated that "any claims the defendant
third-party plaintiff Port Authority may have against the
third-party defendant City of New York in the Federal
Court action shall be preserved."'"
In the federal action, the court approved a stipulation
that dismissed all claims except those of the United States
and the Port Authority against the City.' 9 The City filed a
motion for dismissal of the Port Authority's claim for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.20 The City also moved for
dismissal of the United States' and the Port Authority's
actions for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted.2' The court decided to look beyond the plead-
ings and treat the motions as a motion for summary judg-
ment.2 2 After determining it did have jurisdiction over
the Port Authority,23 the court held that New York law
Appellee at 3, Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1985).






22 Id. A court will grant a motion if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
23 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 99. The district court exercised ancillary jurisdiction
over the Port Authority's claims against the City. Id. The concept of ancillary
jurisdiction allows a district court to acquire jurisdiction over a case or contro-
versy in its entirety and adjudicate issues over which the court could not normally
take cognizance. 13 C. WRIGHT A. MILLER & H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3523 (2d ed. 1984). Courts exercise ancillary jurisdiction to ensure
judgments are given full effect and as a matter ofjudicial economy. Dillon v. Berg
347 F.Supp. 517, 519 (D. Del. 1972)(previous dispute involving false proxy state-
ments did not give jurisdiction to issue order to produce corporate records). An-
cillary jurisdiction attaches when:
(1) the ancillary matter must arise from the same transaction which
was the basis of the main proceeding, or arise during the course of
the main matter, or is an integral part of the main matter; (2) the
ancillary matter can be determined without a substantial new fact-
finding proceeding; (3) determination of the ancillary matter
through a ancillary order would not deprive a party of a substantial
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governed the United States' and Port Authority's claims.24
By New York statute a party released from liability cannot
obtain contribution from another, thus precluding the
contribution claims. 5 The court also determined that
only vicariously liable parties may obtain indemnifica-
tion. 6 Neither party could demonstrate liability soley
through operation of law so the indemnity claim failed. 7
Therefore, because neither party could state a claim for
relief, 'the court granted the motion for summary judg-
ment.28  The United States argued on appeal that the
court should create a federal common law rule of deci-
sion, allowing a settling tortfeasor to recover from code-
fendants, whenever the United States seeks contribution
in an aviation tort case.29 Held, affirmed: State law governs
third-party claims by the United States for contribution
from other defendants in aviation tort cases. Overseas Na-
tionalAirways, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir.
1985).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946
In 1946 Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).30 The FTCA waives, with some exceptions, the
procedural or substantive right; and (4) the ancillary matter must be
settled to protect the integrity of the main proceeding or to insure
that the disposition in the main proceeding will not be frustrated.
Id. Because the state court expressly preserved the claims res judicata did not
apply. Overseas, 766 F. 2d at 99.
24 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 99.
25 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 15-108(c) (McKinney 1978). See Flood v. Re Lou
Location Eng'r, 487 F. Supp. 364, 366 (E.D.N.Y.), af'd, without pub. op., 636 F.2d
1201 (2d Cir. 1980)(prejudgment settling tortfeasor may not recover from
codefendants).
2o Flood, 487 F.Supp. at 367. The New York courts distinguish between "ac-
tive" negligence and vicarious or "passive" negligence. Id. If the defendant is
vicariously liable then he may only claim indemnity from the joint tortfeasor. Id.
27 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 100.
28 Id.
29 Id.
so Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,
1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2671-2680 (1982)).
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government's sovereign immunity from tort suits.3 1
Under the statute, the government is liable for any claim
in the same manner as a private person under similar cir-
cumstances.3 2 The FTCA also contains a number of pro-
cedural directives, including which substantive law to
apply, that a court must follow in litigation under the stat-
ute.3 3  Liability attaches to the United States in accord-
ance with the law of the place where the tort occurred. 4
However, the FTCA does not address issues of contribu-
tion generally, nor third-party claims by and against the
United States for contribution specifically. Therefore, no
express statutory directive exists regarding which law to
apply in contribution cases.
In United States v. Yellow Cab Co. , 35 the United States
Supreme Court held that the FTCA authorized contribu-
tion claims against the United States. 6 The Yellow Cab
-, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1950) (United States is not
liable under FTCA to servicemen injured in activity incident to military service).
32 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). The United States is liable "in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under the circumstances." Id.
33 For example, under the FTCA the judge sits as the trier of fact in all claims.
28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982).
-4 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Liability attaches to the United States "in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Id. Many
scholars strongly disagree with this directive:
Even if the state law requirement was warranted in 1946 when the
FTCA was enacted... it is no longer defensible. The number of
federal laws lacking any counterpart in the private tort law of the
states has grown enormously since then. This growth, coupled with
the expansion of federal constitutional rights for which direct tort
remedies have been recognized, argues strongly that this require-
ment should be repealed and that the newer, distinctively federal law
torts should be integrated into the remedial structure of the FTCA.
P. H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 115 (1983).
- 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
36 Id. at 552. The Court also held that a plaintiff could sustain an action for
contribution by a third-party claim. In fact, the FTCA expressly made the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure applicable, thus providing for third-party practice. Id. at
553. The original version of the FTCA stated "In actions under this part [suits on
tort claims against the United States], the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and
motions, and the practice and procedure, shall be in accordance with the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1934 (U.S.
Stat. 1964) [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]; and the same provisions for coun-
terclaim and set-off, for interest upon judgments, and for payment of judgments,
shall be applicable as in cases brought in the United States district courts....
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Company's passengers suffered injuries in a collision be-
tween a Yellow Taxicab and a mail truck.3 7 The passen-
gers brought suit against the cab company which filed a
third-party complaint against the United States.3 ' The
Court reasoned that the United States consented to con-
tribution claims by the sweeping language "any claim"
contained in the FTCA.3 9 Also, a contribution claim
would not subject the government to a previously unrec-
ognized obligation in light of the availability of contribu-
tion in pre-FTCA private bills of review.4 0 In addition,
the Court found that legislative history indicated that
Congress intended to expand the government's waiver of
sovereign immunity; therefore, limiting the scope of the
FTCA regarding claims for contribution would be incon-
sistent with the statute's purpose.4
The Court did not directly address the choice of law
question. However, in a hypothetical situation it indi-
cated that the government could sue a joint tortfeasor
"local substantive law permitting. ' 42 The Supreme Court
subsequently explained the scope and meaning of the
phrase "law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred," present in the FTCA, in Richards v. United States.43
In Richards, an American Airlines airplane crashed in
Missouri during a flight traveling from Oklahoma to New
Id. at 553 n.9.
37 Id. at 544.
ss Id.
31, Id. at 548.
40 Id. at 548-49. See W. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT 2 (1957).
Previous to the enactment of FTCA the United States and its agents committed a
number of wrongs that would have been actionable if the U.S. were an individual
or corporation. Id. A system developed to compensate injured parties through
private congressional bills of relief. Id. They were "not a matter of right but a
matter of grace." Id.
41 See WRIGHT, supra note 40, at 2.
49 Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 550. In an early report on the bill that would become
the FTCA, the House Judiciary Committee stated, in relation to a proportionate
liability provision that did not become part of the Act, that "in cases involving
joint tort-feasors the rights and liabilities of the United States will be determined
by the local law." H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1942).
, 369 U.S. 1 (1961).
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York.44 The act of negligence occurred in Oklahoma,
where plaintiffs brought suit, but the accident occurred in
Missouri.45 The case required the Court to determine if
"the law" included state choice of law rules.46 The Court
held that the FTCA required application of the "whole
law" of the state where the act or ommission occurred.47
Chief Justice Warren stated that Congress did not intend
to disassociate state law from questions not directly ad-
dressed in a statute, like the FTCA, which is so closely
related to state law.48 Also, the Court commented that
Congress is usually specific in the instances in which it in-
tends federal courts to depart completely from state law.49
Only by its broad interpretation that the "whole law" ap-
plied could the Court treat the United States like a private
individual.50
In almost all claims for contribution and indemnity, de-
rived from the FTCA, federal courts apply state law.5' In
at least two cases, however, the Supreme Court applied
federal law to assess third-party claims by the United
44 Id. at 3.
4-5 Id. The petitioners had each received $15,000 in settlement from the airline,
the maximum recoverable under the Missouri Wrongful Death Act. Id. In Rich-
ards, they sought an additional amount under the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Act
which had no limit to recovery. Id. at 3-4.
4I Id. at 4.
47 Id. at 11. See Brydges & Fagen, The Federal Tort Claims Act As It Relates To
Aviation Accidents, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 244, 248 (1981). The parties originally argued
three alternative applications of the statute: (1) the court should apply the internal
substantive law of the place the negligence occured; (2) the whole law, including
choice of law rules, of the state where the negligence occured; or (3) the internal
law of the state where the operative effect of the negligence took place. Richards,
369 U.S. at 3.
48 Richards, 369 U.S. at 11.
49 Id. at 14.
I d. at 11.
.' See, e.g., United States v. G.E.I.C.O., 612 F.2d 705, 706 (2d Cir. 1980) (apply-
ing regulations of New York State Insurance Department in a suit by the United
States for indemnity); Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326, 1333 (9th Cir.
1979) (the United States is liable under California's comparative negligence sys-
tem); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. United States, 511 F.2d 159, 161 (5th Cir.
1975) (law of Louisiana governs United States duty to pay contribution after set-
tlement); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227, 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 931 (1967) (state law applied to United States claims for indemnity).
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States for indemnification. In United States v. Seckinger, 2
the Supreme Court applied federal law to defeat a third-
party claim for indemnity by the United States against a
government contractor.53 The case involved an employee
of a government contractor who, after suffering a severe
electrical shock and fall, filed a negligence suit against the
United States under the FTCA.5 4 After the employee re-
ceived a judgment under the statute, the United States
filed suit for indemnification from the contractor, basing
its claim on a provision in the government contract.55
The Supreme Court held that federal law controlling the
interpretation of contracts applied because the contract
"was entered into pursuant to authority conferred by fed-
eral statute and, ultimately, by the Constitution. 5 6
The Court looked beyond a government contract ex-
ception to policy reasons to avoid applying state law in a
FTCA related claim in United States v. Gilman. In Gilman,
federal law defeated a claim by the United States for in-
demnification against a government employee. 58  The
plaintiff, a victim of a collision with a government vehicle,
sued the United States. 59 The United States then insti-
52 397 U.S. 203 (1970).
- Id. at 216. The Court held that each party was liable to the extent of its
individual negligence. Id.
.4 Id. at 205.
55 Id. at 205-06. The contract stated that the contractor "shall be responsible
for all damages to person or property that occur as a result of his fault or negli-
gence in connection with the prosecution of the work." Id. at 208 n.9. The Court
found that the contractual provision could not be construed to hold the contrac-
tor responsible for the government's negligence. Id. at 212.
5o Id. at 209-10; See United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183
(1944). The Court in Allegheny stated: "Procurement policies so settled under fed-
eral authority may not be defeated or limited by state law. The purpose of the
supremacy clause was to avoid the introduction of disparities, confusions and con-
flicts which would follow if the government's general authority were subject to
local control." Id. at 183. Seckinger is most often cited in cases that deal with
government contracts. See Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 747 F.2d
547, 552 (9th Cir. 1984) (claim of negligence was not a claim for interference with
contract rights between the government and its contractor which would have af-
forded the government immunity under FTCA).
-17 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
- Id. at 513.
.- Id. at 508.
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tuted a third-party action for indemnification against the
government employee who caused the accident. 60  The
district court found that state law applied and held the
government employee liable for indemnity. 6' The
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the holding of the dis-
trict court. The Court reasoned that because the claim
was not against the United States, but against its em-
ployee, the FTCA did not cover the action.62 Some mini-
mal legislative history also existed which showed that
Congress did not intend to allow the government to sue
its employees for contribution and indemnification.63 In
Gilman, the United States' claim involved relations be-
tween the government and its employees and presented a
number of policy considerations not addressed by Con-
gress concerning discipline, morale, and the financial in-
terests of the government's employees. 64  The Justices
indicated that appraising policy interests is a function
more appropriate for Congress than for the judiciary.65
Therefore, the Court declined to apply state law favoring




62 Id. at 509. See infra note 169 and accompanying text for example of other
cases that do not arise under the FTCA.
63 Gilman, 347 U.S. at 511 n.2. In hearings Assistant Attorney General Francis
Shea explained that the government feared that employee morale would drop,
and the government would incur additional financial liability through repetitive
litigation if the FTCA did not shield employees from liability. Id. See also Hearings
on H.R. 5373 and 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
9-10 (1942).
- 347 U.S. at 510.
615 Id. at 511-13.
66 Id. Scholars often prefer a balancing approach similar to the reasoning in
Gilman, stating:
Although the cases have assumed that state law will determine
whether the United States has a right of contribution these decisions
did not, we believe, adequately weigh the need for a uniform rule. If
the federal court refers to state law the court necessarily determines
that the matter of liability or no-liability is properly one for it to es-
tablish, rather than to wait for congressional action. And since a pri-
vate tort-feasor does not rely upon state law relative to contribution
before commiting the negligent tort, and although it is a mere coin-
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In summation, most courts apply state law in claims by
the United States for contribution and indemnity under
the FTCA However, Seckinger and Gilman demonstrate
that strong federal governmental interests in the con-
struction of government contracts and the interpretation
of federal statutes sufficiently preempted the application
of state law directed in the FTCA.68 What other govern-
mental interests may override the state law directive is an
open question. The courts have not clearly indicated
whether the FTCA state law directive governs third party
claims by the United States not against the United States.69
A third-party claim by the government conceivably may
not fall under the statute.70 If a third-party claim does not
fall under the statute the federal courts may then create a
federal common law rule of decision.
B. Federal Common Law
Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins7' seemed to be the death knell for the federal
common law in diversity cases.72 The Court's opinion
stated that no general federal common law exists.73 The
Supreme Court declared that because Congress has no
power to declare substantive common law rules applicable
in the states, the Constitution does not confer that power
cidence that his joint tort-feasor is the United States, he is not de-
prived of any vested right if a federal rule allows contribution from
him even though, under local law, he would not be subject to contri-
bution if his joint tort-feasor were not the United States.
3J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT &J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.29 (2d ed.
1985).
61 See supra note 51 for applications of state law to contribution and indemnity
claims.
- See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Seckinger and
Gilman.
6 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Seckinger and
Gilman.
70 See infra note 169 and accompanying text for a discussion of third-party
claims not arising under the FTCA.
71 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72 Id. at 78.
7s Id.
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on the federal courts.7 4  After Erie, however, federal
courts continued to promulgate uniform federal common
law rules of decision in other contexts. 75 The most nota-
ble post-Erie case dealing with the power of federal courts
to fashion rules of decision is Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States.76
In Clearfield Trust the United States mailed a check to a
Works Progress Administration employee for work per-
formed.77 However, a third party received the employee's
check.78 The party that received the check transferred it
to J.C. Penney, which transferred it to Clearfield Trust
Company. 79 The United States discovered the problem
but failed to promptly notify the bank.80 The government
subsequently sued Clearfield Trust for reimbursement.8 '
A question arose whether federal or state law controlled
the government's failure to promptly notify the bank. 2
The Supreme Court held that federal law governed the
rights and duties of the United States on commercial pa-
per which it issued.8 3 Erie did not apply because the au-
thority to issue the check came from the Constitution and
74 Id.
75 On the same day as the Erie decision the Supreme Court applied federal com-
mon law to govern a dispute concerning apportionment of an interstate stream.
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)
The numerous issues raised by Erie and its predecessor, Swift v. Tyson, are be-
yond the scope of this article. For a complete discussion, see FREYER, HARMONY
& DISSONANCE: THE SwiFr & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981).
76 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
77 Id. at 364-65.
78 Id. at 365.
79 Id.
8o Id. Neither Clearfeld Trust norJ.C. Penney had any knowledge nor reason-
able suspicion of the forgery. Id.
8' Id. The check was originally drawn on April 28, 1936, however, the govern-
ment did not give notice until January 12, 1937.
82 Id. at 366.
81 Id. Commentators have criticized the Clearfield Trust decision for its reliance
on federal function, defined as activities in which the federal government is in-
volved. Federal function alone will not remove the presumption that state law
governs. Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1526 (1969). For
example, the issuing of money is a federal function, however, no one would claim
that federal common law governs all transfers of cash. Id. at 1527.
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statutes of the United States. 84 The Court observed fur-
ther that, in the absence of an applicable act of Congress,
the federal courts may fashion a governing rule according
to their own standards. 85 Lastly, the application of vari-
ous state laws would subject the United States to "excep-
tional uncertainty ' 86 because identical transactions could
end with different results.87
The Clearfield Trust holding created two questions for
courts to answer in subsequent suits which raise a federal-
state choice of law question. First, may a court exercise its
federal power and create a rule of decision.88 Second, if
the case warrants exercise of federal power, should the
court fashion a federal common law rule or judicially
adopt state law.8 9 Subsequent cases clarified the broad
language in Clearfield Trust. Two of the most notable cases
dealt with acts of Congress that created comprehensive
legislative programs.
In United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 9 the
Supreme Court held that federal law governed a United
States land acquisition agreement.9' The United States
obtained land in Louisiana by condemnation and
purchase pursuant to the Migratory Bird Conservation
Act. 92 The government reserved mineral rights for a pe-
riod of ten years in the vendor-condemnee Little Lake
Misere Land Co.93 The government would extend the
84 Clearkfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366.
- Id. at 367 (citing, United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340, 345-46
(1934) (foreign law applied to foreign check)).
8a Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367. Justice Holmes noted that "the tendancy of
the law must be to narrow the field of uncertainty." O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAw 127 (1881).
87 Clearkeld Trust, 318 U.S. at 367. However, inconsistency of result was not an
overriding concern in Erie. In Erie Justice Brandeis felt that general federal law
had caused forum shopping by individuals who used diversity of citizenship to
avail themselves of more advantageous federal rules. Erie, 304 U.S. at 76.
" See Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV.
881, 886 (1986).
89 Id.
- 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
,, Id. at 591.
1.2 16 U.S.C. § 715 (1982).
11. Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 582-583.
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reservation so long as mineral production or drilling did
not stop for a consecutive sixty day period. 94
Though Little Lake Misere Land Company did not meet
the conditions of extension, it refused to relinquish the
mineral rights.9 5 The company relied on a Louisiana stat-
ute that could extend the reservation indefinitely.96 The
government brought suit to quiet title and urged applica-
tion of federal law.97 In its opinion the Court reasoned
that in activities that arise out of and bear heavily upon a
federal regulatory program the choice-of-law decision is a
federal task for the federal courts.98 Further, in many
cases, no particular provision exists in legislation control-
ling the government's activity.99 Silence in federal legisla-
tion, however, does not necessarily limit the reach of
federal law.'00 Common law rules by necessity must "fill
in interstitially" and effectuate statutory patterns created
by Congress.' 0 ' The Court noted that such reasoning sat-
- Id. at 583.
95 Id.
- Id. at 584. The statute stated:
"When land is acquired by conventional deed or contract, condem-
nation or expropriation proceeding by the United States of America,
or any of its subdivisions or agencies from any person, firm or cor-
poration, and by the act of acquisition, order or judgment, oil, gas or
other minerals or royalties are reserved, or the land so acquired is by
the act of acquisition conveyed subject to a prior sale or reservation
of oil, gas or other minerals or royalties, still in force and effect, the
rights so reserved or previously sold shall be imprescriptible."
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5806 (West Supp. 1973)(repealed 1974).
97 Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 584.
sm Id. at 592. The opinion stated that a corollary to Erie raised the assumption
that dealings between private citizens that are "ordinary" or "local" raise serious
questions of national sovereignty when they arise in the context of a specific con-
stitutional or statutory provision, especially when the Federal Goverment is in-
volved in the case. Id.
w Id. at 593.
... Id.
-1 Id. (quoting Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law ": Competence and Discre-
tion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800
(1957)). Professor Miskin found that complete reliance on statutory provisions for
the solution of all problems is futile. Id. at 800. Political realities often cause
Congress to by-pass issues, leaving their resolution open for the federal courts.
Id. Congress is also limited by shortness of time and the severe limits of human
foresight. Id.
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isfied the first holding related to the power to create a uni-
form rule in Clearfield Trust.'0 2 Also, Clearfield Trust stated
that the right of the United States to seek legal redress in
its proprietary transactions is a federal right so a federal
court may fashion a rule of decision.'0 3
In discussing the second part of the Clearfield Trust hold-
ing, the Court stated that the federal courts would not
adopt hostile state rules that do not provide appropriate
federal standards.'0 4 The opinion noted that when the
outcome of a case bears some relationship to a federal
program a court may apply no rule which is not com-
pletely in accord with the program. 0 5 Because the Louisi-
ana statute contradicted federal interests, state law did
not apply.'0 6 Six years later the Court reached a slightly
different result in a similar question.
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. ,107 the United States
Supreme Court held that federal law governed the prior-
ity of liens in a federal lending program, but adopted state
law as the proper rule of decision.'0 8 In Kimbell Foods, the
United States had obtained a lien as security on a loan
guaranteed by the Small Business Administration under
the Small Business Act (Act).' 0 9 Kimbell Foods had previ-
ously obtained an interest in the same collateral to secure
advances made by the corporation. ' 10 The Act does not
102 Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 593.
103 Id. See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 410 (1964). Friendly went on to say the crucial issue is "what
heed Congress intended to have paid to state law in an area where no heed need
constitutionally to be paid .. " Id. at 410. He also stated, however, that in the
non-proprietary tort area application of federal law is usually prevented by the
FTCA. Id.
,o4 Little Lake Misere 412 U.S. at 595-604.
105 Id. at 604.
106 Id.
107 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
o0 Id. at 740.
- Id. at 718. O.K. Super Markets, the original debtor, obtained a $300,000
loan from Republic National Bank of Dallas secured by business equipment and
merchandise. Id. The Small Business Administration guaranteed ninety percent
of the loan Id. The loan was guaranteed pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) (1984).
11o Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 719. O.K. Super Markets borrowed $27,000
before the federal interest arose from Kimbell Foods who took the stores equip-
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specify rules to govern the priority of liens."I' In dealing
with the choice-of-law issue, Justice Marshall's opinion in-
corporated the bulk of the reasoning in Little Lake Mis-
ere.l1 2 He reached the same conclusion as in Little Lake
Misere; federal law governed." l3 However, under the sec-
ond part of the Clearfield Trust test, the Court adopted
state law as the rule of decision. 1 4 A three step analysis
controls the choice between a federal or state rule. First,
the judiciary must consider the need for uniformity."15
The Supreme Court previously stated that some pro-
grams, by their nature, require a uniform character
throughout the nation."16 Some programs, however, may
operate efficiently without a uniform character.' 1 7 Sec-
ond, state law must not frustrate the objectives of a fed-
eral program."l8 Finally, a court must consider the effect
on state interests if it adopts federal law. 1 9 Ultimately,
the Court chose a state law rule of decision in Kimbell
Foods because the Small Business Act referred to state
ment and merchandise as collateral. Id. at 719. Kimbel protected its interest by
filing a financing statement. Id.
ill Id. at 720 n.6. The district court determined that federal law applied and
analogized federal principles that afford federal statutory tax liens priority over
other interests. The lien first in time is first in right. Id. at 720.
112 Id. at 726-32.
-, Id. at 726.
114 Id. at 731-32.
,i1 Id. at 728.
116 Id. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966) (state law applies to
government contracts negotiated with reference to state law). United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947) (federal law controls government-
soldier relationship).
117 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728. Courts balance the need for uniformity with
other policy considerations. See, U.A.W. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. 383 U.S. 696
(1966). In a labor dispute the court stated "The need for uniformity, then, is
greatest where its absence would threaten the smooth functioning of those con-
sensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote. .. " Id. at
702. See also United States v. Brosnan 363 U.S. 237 (1960). The Court found the
need for uniformity outweighed by "the severe dislocation to local property rela-
tionships which would result from our disregarding state procedures." Id. at 242.
11 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.
119 Id. 728-29. See Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)
(extending Clearfield Trust to diversity cases).
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law, 120 and state law did not burden federal interests.' 2'
Moreover, the private parties involved in the case justifia-
bly relied on state law.12 2 By 1981, however, the Supreme
Court used an extremely different standard to analyze the
creation of a federal common law right.
In 1981 the Supreme Court declined to imply a com-
mon law right of contribution from federal antitrust statu-
tues in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. 121
Importantly, unlike previous cases, the United States was
not a party to this case and its proprietary interests were
not at stake. The decision is noteworthy because of the
very narrow language it uses to describe the power of the
courts to create federal common law. In Texas Industries, a
construction company filed suit against a cement manu-
facturer and several other concrete firms, claiming anti-
trust violations under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 24
Defendant Radcliff Materials filed third-party claims for
contribution against the other defendants. 25 In its opin-
ion, the Court stated that federal common law existed
only in: (1) matters concerning the rights and obligations
of the United States, (2) interstate and international dis-
putes, and (3) in admiralty cases. 12 6 The power to create
common law in those areas falls into two categories: when
a federal rule of decision is "necessary" to "uniquely"
federal interests, and when Congress has given the courts
the power to develop substantive law. 127 The terms "nec-
120 440 U.S. at 730-31. The SBA Financial Assistance Manual indicates the
agency assumes its security interests are controlled by state law. Id. at 730.
121 Id. at 733. Agencies may easily adjust transactions to state priority rules. Id.
122 Id. at 739. Businessmen depend on state commercial law to provide the sta-
bility that is necessary for evaluation of risk. Id.
123 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
1.' Id. at 632. The Sherman Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1982). The Clay-
ton Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 12-27,44 (1982).
IV, Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 633.
1'2 Id. at 641. The approach taken by ChiefJustice Burger has been called the
"enclave approach." See Field, supra note 188, at 911-13. The Supreme Court
has spoken of creating enclaves of federal judge-made law. Banco National De
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964) (validity of foreign sovereign's
acts a matter of federal law).
127 451 U.S. at 640. A necessity standard creates a presumption against the cre-
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essary" and "unique" create a very high standard to meet
in arguing a case for the creation of a uniform rule. The
Court further stated that the right to contribution could
arise in two ways: either by an express or implied right of
action created by Congress, or by the limited power of
federal courts to fashion a common law rule. 28 Congres-
sional intent to create a right of action is found in legisla-
tive history, by identifying the class intended to benefit
from the statute, in the overall legislative scheme, or the
traditional role of states in providing relief.' 29 Also, the
Court found the presumption that Congress deliberately
omitted a remedy from a statute is strongest when Con-
gress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme, in-
cluding a complete set of procedures for enforcement.' 3 0
This comment indicated an apparent step back from the
statement in Little Lake Misere that silence in federal legis-
lation does not limit the reach of federal law.
Several cases have dealt with the federal common law in
the aviation context. Most of the cases have expressed the
federal courts' limited view of their power to create fed-
eral common law rules in aviation accidents. In Executive
Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland,'3 ' the Supreme Court held
federal admiralty jurisdiction does not automactically ex-
ation of federal common law. Most cases assume that a court can create a com-
mon law rule when desirable. See Field, supra note 88, at 945-46.
128 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 638. Many courts do not take such a limited view of
this power. Factors in the creation of a common law rule include: the subject
matter basis for the suit, the strength of state interests, the interstate nature of the
controversy, the presence of a federal party, strength of federal interest, existence
of relevant federal constitutional, treaty or statutory law, and expediency. Vairo,
Multi- Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject or a New Role for Federal Common
Law, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 167, 190 (1985).
.... Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639. See also Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)
(Federal Election Campaign Act does not imply private right to damages to stock-
holders of a corporation for violation of the statute).
Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 645. The Supreme Court stated in one case:
In almost any statutory scheme, there may be a need for judicial in-
terpretation of ambigious or incomplete provisions. But the author-
ity to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority
to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress
has decided not to adopt.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981).
-, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
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ist over aviation torts occurring in flights over navigable
waters. In Executive Jet an aircraft struck a flock of seagulls
on take-off from Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland.13 2
The airplane, on a charter from Cleveland to Portland,
Maine, crashed into the navigable waters of Lake Erie a
short distance from the airport. 33 The plaintiffs invoked
admiralty jurisdiction and brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 34
The bulk of the opinion deals with the problems caused
by aircraft under admiralty jurisdiction and the formation
of a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activ-
ity" test to bring a small number of aircraft accidents oc-
curing at sea within admiralty jurisdiction. 35 The Court
met the argument that admiralty jurisdiction would serve
the advisable goal of a uniform law for all aviation torts
occurring over navigable waters with the view that Con-
gress could enact applicable legislation under the Com-
merce Clause. 36 Outside such legislation, federal courts
would not use admiralty jurisdiction to create a uniform
rule for aviation torts.'3 7 The Court, in sweeping lan-
guage, stated that Congress may only limit powers consti-
tutionally reserved to the states to adjudicate
controversies by acts which conform to the judiciary sec-
tion of the Constitution.3 8 Also, a due regard for the
rightful independence of state courts requires federal
courts to limit their jurisdiction to that defined by federal
statute. 139
132 Id. at 250.
133 Id.
14 Id. at 250-5 1. The admiralty jurisdiction statute is codified in, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1) (1982). Admiralty jurisdiction is limited to maritime transportation,
navigation, employment, or commerce on navigable waters. Swift & Co. Packers
v. Compania Transmaritima Colombiana, 83 F.Supp. 273, 277 (Canal Zone 1948),
aft'd, 175 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1949).
,55 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 250-73. Unless the wrong bears a significant rela-
tionship to traditional maritime activity, claims arising from aircraft crashes are
not covered by admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 272.
, Id. at 274.
17 Id.
1- Id. at 272-73.
359 Id. at 272. The court stated:
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The Court also took a limited view of its power to cre-
ate federal common law in Miree v. DeKalb County.' 40  In
Miree, the Supreme Court refused to apply federal law in
an aviation disaster. An aircraft ingested a number of
birds from a nearby landfill shortly after takeoff from the
DeKalb County Georgia Airport. 14 1 Diversity of citizen-
ship formed the basis for federal jurisdiction. 42  The
plaintiffs sued on a third-party beneficiary theory, based
on six contracts between the County and the FAA.143 In
these contracts the County agreed to use land adjacent to
the airport for activities compatible with normal airport
operations; however, the County allegedly breached the
agreement by maintaining a garbage dump near the air-
port. 44 The District Court held that the County's govern-
mental immunity barred the contract claims. 45  The
Supreme Court noted it may apply federal common law,
even in diversity cases, when a uniform national rule is
necessary to further the federal government's interests.
146 Nevertheless, the Court held that state law applied be-
cause the litigation raised no questions regarding the lia-
bility of the United States. 47 The fact that the United
The power reserved to the states, under the Constitution, to provide
for the determination of controversies in their courts may be re-
stricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary
sections of the Constitution... Due regard for the rightful indepen-
dence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, re-
quires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the
precise limits which [a federal] statute has defined.
Id. at 272-73 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
14o 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
141 Id. at 27.
142 Id. at 26. The diversity statute is, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
145 Miree, 433 U.S. at 27.
144 Id. See 40 C.F.R. § 241.202-2(e) (1986) (airports must be located away from
bird hazards).
45 Miree, 433 U.S. at 27.
46 Id. at 29; See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sec. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956) (United States interests too speculative and remote to justify application of
federal law in a suit involving private parties only).
147 Miree, 433 U.S. at 28. Federal common law often, though not invariably,
results when the United States is a party. Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 591. When
the United States is a party it has two interests, an interest in uniformity for its
own sake, which is content neutral, and an interest in a rule whose content favors
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States has a substantial interest in the regulation of air
travel and promoting air safety was not dispositive in
such a narrow question. 48  In fashioning common law
rules, the Court asserted that a significant conflict must
exist between a federal policy or interest and the use of
state law.' 4 9 Justice Rehnquist noted that the right to sue
as third-party beneficiary of the government contract
could possibly advance FAA policy encouraging compli-
ance with FAA regulations. 50 Assuming that this notion
was correct, Justice Rehnquist nevertheless found that
Congress must make the decision to displace state law on
such an issue, and that Congress had not chosen to do
so. '5 He pointed out that Congress, in the late 1960's,
failed to give serious consideration to a bill providing a
federal cause of action in aircraft disasters.15 2 One note-
worthy case, however, deviated from this strict, limited
view of federal judicial power.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals fashioned a uni-
form federal common law rule of decision for contribu-
tion and indemnity in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.153 At
the time of the decision, the legal community viewed the
government interests. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993-
94 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981) (state law governs claims in
Agent Orange tort cases).
148Miree, 433 U.S. at 31.
14') Id. (citing Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. 384, U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
,.5( Miree, 433 U.S. at 32.
1.51 Id.
'2 Id. at 32 n.5. Senator Tydings introduced legislation for a comprehensive
body of federal law governing aviation activity, but, after the Senator failed to be
re-elected, the measure died. See Sanders, The Tyding Bill, 36J. AIR L. & COM. 550,
551 (1970). There have been more recent moves to create a uniform national tort
law. In 1985 Congress considered a substantial change in the entire body of
products liability law including preemption of state law by federal causes of ac-
tion. See Product Liability Act: Hearings on S. 100 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 3-10
(1985). Also, in 1986, the executive branch sought similar reforms. The Reagan
Administration's Tort Policy Working Group proposed a broad set of reforms in-
cluding: elimination ofjoint and several liability in cases where the defendants did
not act in concert, limiting of attorney's contingency fees and encouragement of
the use of alternative dispute resolution. Willard, Restore Balance to the Tort System,
A.B.A.J., July 1, 1986 at 36.
'- 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
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case as one of the most important decisions in aviation
law in recent years. 154 The case arose out of a mid-air col-
lision between an Allegheny Airlines DC-9 and a private
aircraft. 55 Eighty-three occupants died in the crash.' 56
The decedent's survivors brought wrongful death actions
in eight different United States District Courts. 15 7 The Ju-
dicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assumed jurisdic-
tion over the suits and transferred them to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
for the supervision of discovery.15 Allegheny Airlines and
the United States filed cross-claims and third-party claims
for contribution and indemnity. 159 The United States and
Allegheny settled with the passengers and proceeded for
contribution against the other defendants in the case.' 60
The district court applied Indiana law and dismissed the
contribution claims; however, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed, holding that a federal law of contribution and in-
demnity applied in actions arising from mid-air
collisions.1 6' The Court of Appeals primarily sought to
eliminate the inconsistency of results among similar air-
,- The case was called "one of the most momentous decisions in aviation law in
the last several decades." S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAw § 6.1
(1978).
155Kohr, 504 F.2d at 401.
156 Id.
157 Id.
,58 Id. at 401-02. The case was moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consists of seven district or circuit
judges. Id. at 1407(d). The Panel may transfer to any district, for coordinate or
consolidated proceedings, any civil action involving one or more common ques-
tions of fact pending in different districts. Id. at 1407(a). Either the Panel or a
party in an action appropriate for transfer may initiate consolidation proceedings.
Id. at 1407(c). The Judicial Panel may make the transfer upon its determination
that the proceedings will be convenient for the witnesses and the parties and will
promote just and efficient conduct of the actions. Id. at 1407(a). The proceedings
usually deal with discovery, non-discovery pre-trial motions, and settlement. See
Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution To A Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L.
REV. 467, 522-26 (1985).
,'o Kohr, 504 F.2d at 402.
- Id. The other defendants included the estate of Robert Carey, pilot of the
private aircraft, Forth Corporation, ownei" of the plane and Brookside Corpora-
tion, owner of Forth Corporation. Id. at 401.
16, Id. at 402.
763
764 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
craft collisions.' 62  A uniform air law was necessary be-
cause the Federal Aviation Act created a uniform system
of flight rules and centralized authority in the FAA Ad-
ministrator to issue regulations for safety in the national
airspace. 163 The Seventh Circuit found the argument for
federal preemption advanced because the plaintiff sued
the government under the FTCA, and the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation had supervised the litigation
since its inception. 164 The court then adopted a rule al-
lowing a settling tortfeasor to seek contribution and in-
demnity, thus encouraging settlement. 65
Language in more recent Seventh Circuit opinions,
however, appears to severely limit or completely disfavor
the holding in Kohr. In Bowen v. United States, 166 the Sev-
enth Circuit refused to extend Kohr to cases arising under
the FTCA.' 67 In Bowen, a pilot sued the FAA for negli-
gence in failing to warn of icing conditions that caused his
aircraft to crash. 168  The court first distinguished Kohr
162 Id. at 403.
63 Id. at 404. The only Federal Aviation Act section that the court cited is enti-
tled "Declaration of National Sovereignty in Air Space, Operation of Foreign Air-
craft" and concerns the United States' sovereignty over aircraft from other
countries in United States airspace. 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1982). The court pointed
to no other section from which preemption can be inferred. See Note, Federal Com-
mon Law in Aviation, 41J. AIR L. & CoM. 347, 352-53 (1975).
-6 Kohr, 504 F.2d at 404. The court did not deal with the Erie doctrine even
though jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Presumably, the impact of the Erie doctrine should be "explained or
distinguished." Prewitt, Federal Common Law of Aviation and the Erie Doctrine, 40 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 653, 659 (1974). The presence of the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation may, in part, explain the holding. Before the Panel's creation,
problems arose in aircraft disaster litigation as to venue, difficult conflict-of-law
questions, and application of different sets of law in the same courtroom. The
Panel's scope, however, is limited to pre-trial proceedings. This judicial frustra-
tion with the Panel was manifest in Kohr. See, Comment, The Case For A Federal
Common Law of Aircraft Disaster Litigation: A Judicial Solution to a National Problem, 51
N.Y.U.L. REV. 231, 237-42 (1976).
65 Kohr, 504 F.2d at 405. The FTCA encourages settlement. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2677 (1982). Section 2677 states, "The Attorney General or his designee may
arbitrate, compromise, or settle any claim cognizable under section 1346(b) of
this title, after commencement of an action theron." Id.
- 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
167 Id. at 1316.
168 Id. at 1314.
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from Bowen by stating that because Kohr involved a United
States third-party claim for contribution and indemnity it
did not "arise" under the FTCA. 16 9 Also, recent Supreme
Court dictum limited the Seventh Circuit's power to ex-
tend Kohr. 7 0 The previously cited language in Miree and
Executive Jet persuaded the court to reject federal law.' 71
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill On May 25,
1978,172 the Seventh Circuit went as far as to say recent
Supreme Court cases suggested that the court could not
depart from state law in air crash cases. 173
II. OVERSEAS NATIONAL AIRWAYS V. UNITED STATES
On appeal, the United States requested the creation of
a federal common law rule of decision applicable when
the United States seeks contribution from joint tortfeasors
in an aviation torts case.1 74 A divided panel of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court re-
lied mainly on three sources for its opinion: the Federal
Tort Claims Act, Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland,
and United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 175 At the outset, the ma-
jority conceded that the petitioners set forth persuasive
policy arguments for a uniform federal rule of decision. 76
The court noted the national government has almost an
exclusive interest in regulation of the nation's airways.' 77
Congress had authorized the FAA to certify airports and
aircraft and insure the safety of air travel. 78 A uniform
rule would also eliminate inconsistency of results. 17 9
169 Id. at 1316 n.6.
170 Id. at 1316-17.
171 Id. See supra notes 140-152 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miree
and notes 131-139 for a discussion of Executive Jet.
M" 644 F.2d 633, (7th Cir. 1981).
7 Id. at 637 n.6.
171 Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. United States, 766 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir.
1985).
175 Id. at 100-102.
176 Id. at 100.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. In the majority's opinion, the presence of the United States in particular
made the argument compeling for the creation of an aviation tort rule.
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The Court of Appeals, however, felt constrained by the
FTCA and previous Supreme Court decisions. 80 The
FTCA provides that a trier of fact must judge the United
States' liability in accordance with the law of the state
where the act or omission occurred. 8' The court cited
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., stressing that the Supreme
Court had indicated, albeit in dictum, that state law gov-
erns claims by the United States in FTCA cases.' 8 2 The
panel also distinguished as sui generis the two cases in
which the Supreme Court used federal law, in indemnifi-
cation claims by the United States, when liability derived
from the FTCA. 83 The court stated that United States v.
Seckinger held only that federal law clearly controlled the
interpretation of government contracts. 8 4 The Court of
Appeals also dismissed United States v. Gilman on two
grounds. First, Congress did not fully address the ques-
tion of indemnity from government employees when it
enacted the FTCA. 8 5 Second, the legislative history that
did exist showed that Congress probably did not intend to
allow the government a right of action against its
employees. 18 6
The majority found that Executive Jet v. City of Cleveland
controlled in Overseas. Executive Jet presented to the
Supreme Court the same policy arguments that Overseas
presented to the Second Circuit. 8 7 In the majority opin-
ion, Executive Jet's language that a due regard for the inde-
pendence of state governments should cause the federal
courts to limit their jurisdiction found a broad applica-
I, ld. See supra notes 30-34 for a discussion of FTCA.
Overseas, 766 F.2d at 101. See 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1982).
182 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 101. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Yellow Cab.
- Overseas, 766 F.2d at 102.
,-' Id. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for discusiion of Seckinger.
18, Overseas, 766 F.2d at 102. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Gilman.
-. Overseas, 766 F.2d at 102.
187 Id. at 100. See supra notes 131-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Executive Jet.
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tion.18 Executive Jet did not apply exclusively to admiralty
jurisdiction but to all aviation cases.8 9 The court pointed
out that Congress was free, under the Commerce Clause,
to enact legislation to deal with aviation litigation. 190 In
sum, the Second Circuit stated that a fair reading of Execu-
tive Jet would not permit a court to form a federal rule of
decision to preempt state tort law. 191 Lastly, the court
stated that, as a practical matter, because the United
States has no greater interest when it seeks contribution
than when it is sued for contribution state law should ap-
ply. 192 The majority then stated that New York law barred
the United States' claims for contribution and
indemnity. 193
The dissent agreed with the majority's reading of New
York law, but almost nothing else. Justice Oakes, the lone
dissenter, found neither the FTCA nor Executive Jet barred
the application of federal law. He noted that the FTCA
clearly states that the law of the state where the act or
omission occurred governs claims against the United
States. 194 The instant case, however, is a claim by the
United States not against it. 195 The dissent also stated that
Yellow Cab held only that contribution claims against the
United States were cognizable; the dictum "local substan-
tive law permitting" should not limit the application of
federal law. 196 Justice Oakes cited both Seckinger and
Gilman as demonstrating that the FTCA does not govern
third-party claims by the government. 97 He also noted
188 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 102.
189 Id.
1-o Id. at 101.
19' Id.
192 Id. The court stated "it adds nothing in cases such as this to assert that
'application of state laws . . . would subject the rights and duties of the United
States to exceptional uncertainty.' " Id.
,- Id. at 102-103. Neither appellant (Port Authority nor the United States) of-
fered a theory where it was liable to plaintiff soley because of the City's negli-
gence, therefore, neither could receive indemnification. Id. at 103.
1 Id. at 103.
19 . Id.
1" Id. Justice Oakes described the phrase as "parenthetical." Id.
197 Id.
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Executive Jet dealt exclusively with the extension of admi-
ralty jurisdiction to aviation cases. 198 A subject-matter ju-
risdiction problem did not exist in Overseas, therefore,
Executive Jet could not limit the choice of rules of deci-
sion. 199 The two questions to answer were: first, does the
court have power to create a federal rule and second,
should the court fashion a uniform rule or adopt a state
rule. 20 0 The underlying action in the suit was predicated
on federal law, namely the FTCA. Therefore, he relied on
the Kimbell Foods holding that government activities aris-
ing from and bearing on federal interests warrant the use
of federal law.20 ' The analysis that ultimately lead to the
adoption of state law in Kimbell Foods was that the statute
expressly referred to the state law, would not burden fed-
eral interests, and the private parties relied on the law did
not apply in Overseas.2 °2 The FTCA does not address the
United States' ability to seek contribution of what law to
apply.20 3 The Supreme Court, in other contexts, held that
a federal rule of decision governs the third-party claims of
the United States for indemnity when primary liability de-
rived from the FTCA.2 °4 The dissent also noted that a
state law rule that a settling tortfeasor cannot recover a
voluntary payment burdens the government's interests
favoring settlement and uniformity of FAA obligations.2 0 5
Also, he found no evidence indicated that any of the par-
ties relied on state law.20 6
Justice Oakes analogized the present case with Little




o Id. The Court also cited In Re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d
987, 990 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). See supra notes 107-122
and accompanying text for a discussion of Kimbell Food.
202 766 F.2d at 105. See supra notes 107-122 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Kimbell Food.
2o Overseas, 766 F.2d at 105.
2 4 Id.
205. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (1982).
209 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 105.
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eral courts could not borrow hostile state law rules.2 °7
The dissent cited Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. and Texas
Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. as evidence that a court
would create a common law right of contribution in the
proper circumstances. 20 ' Lastly, Justice Oakes would limit
the holding in Kohr to third-party claims by the United
States.20 9 Citing Miree v. DeKalb County, Justice Oakes
stated case law clearly distinguishes between the rights of
the United States and private parties.21 0
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Overseas is noteworthy, not only for its precedential
value, but also as an illustration of a subtle shift in attitude
by the federal judiciary about its powers to create federal
common law and extend that power into areas tradition-
ally reserved to the states. Comparing Little Lake Misere,
Kimbell Foods, and Texas Industries, Overseas is the culmina-
tion of an increasingly strict reasoning limiting the courts
power to create federal common law. Justice Rehnquist
most persuasively stated this new attitude in Miree v.
DeKalb County. He stated that there must exist a signifi-
cant conflict, specifically shown, between a federal interest
and state law before a court may create a federal rule.2 1
He stressed that the displacement of state law is a task for
representative legislative bodies, not for the judiciary.2 t2
The trend for such reasoning will probably continue.
Justice Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice and the ap-
pointment of Antonin Scalia strengthens the conservative
block on the court. Both Justices are known for their be-
lief in limited judicial power and the court's limited role in
207 Id.
20o Id. at 104. The court also cited Cooper Stevedoring v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417
U.S. 106 (1974) (creating a right of contribution in admiralty cases).
209 Overseas, 766 F.2d at 105. See supra notes 140-152 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Miree.
210 Id. The court also cited Nortwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451
U.S. 77 (1981) (no contribution for violation of Equal Pay Act).
211 See supra notes 140-152 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miree.
212 See supra notes 140-152 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miree.
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setting public policy.2 13 Thus, Congress must create a uni-
form rule that the courts may apply in aviation accidents.
The legislature branch has made attempts to create a uni-
form aviation law, all failures. 4 Congress, however, in
future legislation may, under the guise of tort reform, cre-
ate a uniform body of tort law when the United States is a
party.21 5 Until that time, the judiciary appears have no
choice but to follow state law.
Overseas is also noteworthy for its apparent departure
from the holding in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. Argua-
bly, the facts in Overseas may be fundamentally different.
The Seventh Circuit limited the Kohr decision to mid-air
collisions between aircraft flying in the national air-space.
The decision primarily appeared as response to frustra-
tion with the procedural complexities of mass-tort litiga-
tion. The jurisdiction of the Judicial Panel for
Multidistrict Litigation also played a large role in the deci-
sion.216 In Overseas the accident only involved a single air-
craft and the Panel never exercised jurisdiction over the
case. The majority opinion, however, took little notice of
the Kohr opinion, perhaps illustrating its lack of probative
value. The Seventh Circuit has also retreated from its
own holding in Kohr in subsequent cases, bringing into
question the validity of the opinion.21 7
Whether the Supreme Court will extend the extremely
narrow reasoning of Texas Industries to cases involving the
United States is an open question. Texas Industries and
Miree did not directly involve the government as a party.
Naturally, the presence of the United States as a party may
increase the presumption that Federal interests are en-
dangered.2 18 However, the narrow question in Overseas
which directly involved the United States clearly failed to
preempt state law.
21-1 Marcotte, New Kid On the Block, A.B.AJ., Aug. 1, 1986 at 20.
214 See supra note 152 for a discussion of the Tyding's Bill.
21. See supra note 152 for a discussion of tort reform.
2,1 See supra notes 153-165 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kohr.
211 See supra notes 153-165 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kohr.
2" See supra note 147 for a discussion of suits where the United States is a party.
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In sum, the Court in Overseas followed the generally ac-
cepted premise that the FTCA requires the application of
state law in suits involving the United States. A court will
only deviate from the directive when the vital interests of
the United States are at stake. The desire of the United
States to recover for a voluntary settlement is not suffi-
cient reason to displace the power of the states to control
the disposition of tort suits. Therefore, state law governs
third party claims by the United States for contribution in
aviation tort cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority in Overseas reached the correct conclusion
but through rather confused reasoning. Both the majority
and minority opinion focused on extensive regulation
under the Federal Aviation Act. However, the opinion
should have concentrated on the provisions of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. There exists a significant gap in this
seemingly "comprehensive" legislation. Congress clearly
intended state law to apply in claims against the United
States but there is a real question whether this directive
applies to third party claims by the United States. The
Second Circuit should have gone through the two step
analysis of Clearfield Trust. When there is a gap in a com-
prehensive legislative scheme, a court may fill in provi-
sions interstitally to effecuate statutory patterns created
by Congress. This fact satisfies the first portion of the
Clearfield Trust holding that a federal court must determine
whether it may exercise its federal power to create a rule
of decision. Secondly, the court must determine whether
to adopt a uniform federal rule or judicially adopt state
law. Allowing settling tortfeasors to seek contribution
from other tortfeasors may encourage settlement. The
various states that do not allow a settling tortfeasor to re-
cover may financially burden the United States' interests.
State rules of contribution, however, do not burden the
FAA's ability to operate and protect the safety of airline
passengers. As a practical matter the United States could
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present no cogent reason why it suffers more than a pri-
vate individual or a company doing business in several
states who cannot seek contribution. In Overseas, if the
United States could have shown such a reason the court
might have decided the case differently.
Mark Allen Cooper
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT -Ju-
DICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL
QUALIFICATION EXCEPTION - In an action brought under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, a bona fide
occupational qualification defense is available only if the
defendant can establish, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the age qualification is reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business. Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).
Western Air Lines, Inc. (Western) is a federally certified
commercial air carrier engaged in the business of provid-
ing safe transportation of passengers by air.I Western op-
erates a variety of aircraft, including the Boeing 727 and
the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10. 2 For operation these air-
craft require three crew members in the cockpit: a Cap-
tain, a First Officer, and a Second Officer. The Captain
functions as the pilot in command and is responsible for
all phases of operation.4 The First Officer performs the
duties of copilot and assists the Captain; the Second Of-
ficer acts as the flight engineer.5 The flight engineer usu-
ally monitors an instrument panel facing the side of the
aircraft; he does not operate the controls of the aircraft
unless both the Captain and the First Officer become
incapacitated.6
I Brief for Petitioner, Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 105 S. Ct. 2743
(1985) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
7 Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 105 S. Ct. 2743, 2746 (1985).
3 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1.
4Id.
5Id.
6 Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2746. Western's philosophy of flying is a coor-
dinated crew concept. Each crew member performs specific duties throughout
the flight based upon this position in the cockpit. Although only the Captain and
First Officer actually manipulate the flight controls, under Western's system, all
crew members take active roles in the operation of the aircraft. Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 1.
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In 1978, respondents Charles Criswell and Rulon
Starley were Captains operating DC- 10's for Western.7 In
July of 1978 both men reached their sixtieth birthdays.8
In order to avoid mandatory retirement in accordance
with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulation,
both men applied for reassignment as flight engineers.9
7 Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2747.
* Id.
* Id. The FAA prohibits any person from serving as a pilot or copilot on a
commercial flight after reaching the age of sixty. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1986).
The regulation states:
No certificate holder may use the services of any person as a pilot on
an airplane engaged in operations under this part if that person has
reached his 60th birthday. No person may serve as a pilot on an
airplane engaged in operations under this part if that person has
reached his 60th birthday.
Id. The FAA justified its adoption of a mandatory retirement for pilots and copi-
lots on the theory that "the risks of suffering incapacitating medical events and of
adverse psychological, emotional, and physical changes rise" with advancing age.
49 Fed. Reg. 14,695 (1984). Although the rule is arbitrary in that it will exclude
some pilots who would not be afflicted by any physical or mental problems if al-
lowed to continue flying, the rule itself represents the FAA's recognition that
there is "a present inability to distinguish those pilots who, as a consequence of
aging, present a threat to safety from those who do not." Id. The courts have
upheld the FAA's age sixty retirement rule. See, e.g., Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding that FAA's denial of pilot's petition for exemption from
the age-sixty retirement rule was not arbitrary and capricious because medical
tests proposed by pilot were not sufficiently reliable to compel his employment in
a position of great stress and responsibility where sudden incapacitation could
jeopordize many lives).
The FAA adopted the age sixty rule on March 15, 1960, and it has been the
subject of considerable controversy ever since. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1986); see
also Brief for Petitoner, supra note 1. Despite extensive examination, however, the
FAA has reaffirmed the rule as recently as April 12, 1984. 49 Fed. Reg. 14,692
(1984). Although many individual pilots have sought exemptions from this rule,
and although some pilots seeking exemptions have had outstanding medical
records, the FAA has never granted an exemption. See, e.g., Keating, 610 F.2d at
613. Despite this rule, the FAA has refused to adopt a similar mandatory retire-
ment age for flight engineers:
After review of all the comments, the FAA is unable to determine
that flight engineers should be subject to the same age limits as pi-
lots in command and seconds in command. While a flight engineer
has important duties which contribute to the safe operation of the
airplane, he or she may not assume the responsibilities of the pilot in
command. In the event of the incapacitation of the pilot in com-
mand, the second in command would be expected to assume com-
mand of the aircraft.
49 Fed. Reg. 14,694 (1984).
The FAA went on to note that available statistics demonstrate that flight engi-
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Western denied both requests, apparently because both
employees participated in the company's retirement plan
which required all crew members to retire at the age of
sixty.' 0 Respondent Albert Ron, a career flight engineer,
was also forced to retire in 1978 after his sixtieth
birthday. "
neers have rarely been a contributing cause or factor in commercial aircraft acci-
dents or incidents. Id. Based upon insufficiently available data, the FAA decided
not to propose an age beyond which flight engineers should not be permitted to
serve. In deciding against imposing a mandatory retirement age for flight engi-
neers, the FAA partially relied upon air carrier accident/incident data provided by
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). From 1962 through 1981, out
of a total 1,616 accidents/incidents, the NTSB cited a flight engineer as a cause in
only thirteen cases and as a factor in only four cases. All flight engineers involved
in these accidents/incidents were younger than sixty years of age. Id.
lo Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2747. Western rejected Captain Criswell's bid
solely because he was approaching age sixty and because Western had a policy
which required all flight deck personnel to retire at age sixty. His bid was not
rejected on the basis that there were no flight engineer openings, or because no
openings were contemplated, or for any other reason normally associated with
consideration of bids by flight deck personnel. Criswell v. Western Air Lines,
Inc., 514 F. Supp. 384, 388 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983),
aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).
Western also involuntarily retired Captain Starley in July of 1978 when he
reached the age of sixty. He had been employed by Western as a pilot or copilot
for thirty-two years and had been a DC-10 Captain for the five years prior to his
retirement. One year prior to his sixtieth birthday, Captain Starley learned that
Western would soon have several positions available for flight engineers on DC-
10 aircraft as a result of the acquisition of some new planes. In September of
1977, Captain Starley submitted a bid for a DC-10 flight engineer position after
discussing the bid with Western's Vice President for Flight Operations. The next
month, Western actually accepted Starley's bid and awarded him the position of
flight engineer. In addition, Starley discussed with Western personnel the train-
ing normally given by Western to flight engineers who transfer from one position
to another. In February of 1978, however, Western informed Starley that the po-
sition was no longer available to him, claiming that Western had awarded the po-
sition in error, and requiring that Starley retire upon reaching his sixtieth birthday
in accordance with the normal retirement policy set forth in its pilot pension plan.
Criswell, 514 F. Supp. at 388.
The Western official who was responsible for the decision to retire Criswell and
Starley stated to the court that the sole basis for the denial of the transfer applica-
tions was the provision in the pension plan regarding retirement at age sixty. He
also admitted that he had no personal knowledge of any safety rationale for the
age sixty retirement of all flight engineers. Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2747 n.4.
, Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2747. In June of 1978, Albert Ron reached the
age of sixty. He was a career Second Officer, never choosing to advance to Cap-
tain or First Officer. He had worked for Western since 1945, and had served as a
flight engineer since 1954. He, as well as Starley, had discussed continued em-
ployment with Western's management personnel, and in December of 1977, gave
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Criswell, Starley and Ron filed suit against Western on
June 6, 1979, alleging that the under-age-sixty qualifica-
tion for the position of flight engineer violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 2 All three
plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions to prevent West-
ern from enforcing its mandatory retirement policy. 13
The court denied the applications of Criswell and Starley,
who were then Captains, but the court granted the appli-
cation of Ron, the flight engineer.' 4 Consequently, West-
ern forced Criswell and Starley to retire shortly after the
commencement of the action, but allowed Ron to con-
tinue his employment as a DC-10 flight engineer.' 5 In
September of 1979, the district court denied Western's
motion for summary judgment against Criswell and
Starley.16 Ajury heard the case in October and November
of 1980.17 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs,
finding that Western had willfully violated the ADEA, and
awarded damages to Criswell, Starley and Ron.' 8 The dis-
Western written notice of his intention to remain in his position as DC-10 flight
engineer past his sixtieth birthday. In February of 1978, Ron was informed that,
in accordance with the pilot pension plan, he would be retired at age sixty. Cris-
well, 514 F. Supp. at 388.
12 Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2747. The ADEA provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982).
1, Criswell, 514 F. Supp. at 387.
' Id. The district court did not explain why Ron's application for preliminary
injunction was granted while those of Criswell and Starley were denied.
16 Id.
16 Brief for Respondent at 3, Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 105 S. Ct.
2743 (1985) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
17 Id. at 4.
18 Criswell, 514 F. Supp. at 387. The jury awarded damages in the amounts of
$60,393.87, $52,088.94, and $5,000.00 to Criswell, Starley and Ron respectively.
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trict court also granted equitable relief, finding no merit
in Western's "reasonable factors other than age"' 9 or
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ)20
defenses.
Western appealed the decision of the district court, but
the court of appeals affirmed in all respects. 2' In particu-
lar, the court of appeals rejected Western's argument that
the trial court's jury instruction on the BFOQ defense
failed to sufficiently defer to the airline's legitimate con-
cern for the safety of its passengers.22 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to examine the
applicability of the BFOQ defense.23 Held affirmed: In an
action brought under the ADEA, an age-related employ-
ment criterion may qualify as a BFOQ only if the defend-
ant can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the age qualification is reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business. Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985).24
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress initially enacted the ADEA "to promote em-
ployment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment. ' 25 In enacting the ADEA, Congress clearly
Id. The jury concluded that Western's mandatory retirement at age sixty for flight
engineers did not qualify as a BFOQ even though it was purportedly adopted for
safety reasons. Id. at 398.
19 Id. at 391-93.
20 Id. at 389-92.
2, Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 559 (9th Cir. 1983).
22 Id. at 549-51.
21 Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2749.
24 The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly stated the BFOQjury
instructions in light of the ADEA and the airline's interest in protecting public
safety. Id. at 2754-55.
25 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1978). President Lyndon B.Johnson, in his Older Amer-
ican Message of January 23, 1967, recommended that the ADEA of 1967 be en-
acted. This message was presented to Congress in February of 1967 by the
Secretary of Labor. The President's message, in part, stated that:
Hundreds of thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find
themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination. Despite
our present low rate of unemployment, there has been a persistent
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recognized that the sincerity of an employer's belief in
stereotypical views of the value of older workers, rather
than providing a defense to the ADEA, was a significant
part of the employment problem.26 Congress enacted the
average of 850,000 people age 45 and over who are unemployed.
Today more than 3/4 of the billion dollars in unemployment insur-
ance is paid each year to workers who are 45 and over. They com-
prise 27% of all the unemployed .... In economic terms, this is a
serious-and senseless-loss to a nation on the move. But the
greater loss is the cruel sacrifice in happiness and well being, which
joblessness imposes on these citizens and their families. Opportu-
nity must be opened to the many Americans over 45 who are quali-
fied and willing to work. We must end arbitrary age limits on hiring.
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 229 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting
113 CONG. REC. 34,743-44 (1967)).
26 See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Cris-
well, 105 S. Ct. 2743 (1985) [hereinafter Brief for EEOC]. See also Western Air
Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2749-51. The congressional findings underlying the purpose
of the ADEA are stated in section 2(a) as follows:
The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment,
and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise
desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemploy-
ment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer ac-
ceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among older
workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their employ-
ment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary dis-
crimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1982).
The Director of the Office of Aging of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, when testifying before the Subcommittee on Employment and Retire-
ment Incomes of the Special Committee on Aging of the United States Senate,
stated:
It is one of the anomalies, that every time we go in [sic] an employer
and we say to him, 'Tell us who are your most valuable employees,'
he will almost invariably name his older employees, the people who
have been with the company for many years. But if for some reason
or another, because of automation or because of change in tech-
niques, those people are thrown out of work, the older person finds
the greater difficulty in being employed.
Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 229 n. 11. (citing Hearings of Subcomm. on Employment and Retire-
ment Incomes of the Special Comm. on Aging, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1963) (state-
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ADEA to correct many mistaken, though sincere, beliefs
which employers often hold regarding the effects of aging
on a person's ability to perform effectively.2 7 In 1965, the
Secretary of Labor reported to Congress that, despite
modern medical information, there "is persistent and
widespread use of age limits in hiring that in a great many
cases can be attributed only to arbitrary discrimination
against older workers on the basis of age and regardless
of ability."' 28 As a consequence, the ADEA focuses on the
objective requirements of the job, and not on the subjec-
tive beliefs of the employer.2 9 The ADEA established as
its primary objectives research and education to correct
these widespread inaccurate beliefs about the productivity
of older workers.3
Despite the ADEA's strong opposition to age discrimi-
nation in employment, it does recognize that there are
some instances in which age is relevant to job perform-
ance. 3 1 Although the ADEA normally prohibits
mandatory retirement before age seventy, it provides for
an exception in the case of a bona fide occupational quali-
fication. The ADEA provides, in pertinent part:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment
agency, or labor organization (1) to take any action other-
wise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of
this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
ment of the Director of the Office of Aging of the Department of the Health,
Education and Welfare)).
27 See Brief for EEOC, supra note 26. See also Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at
2749-51.
28 Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2749 (quoting Report of the Secretary of La-
bor, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment 21 (1965);
EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 37
(1981)).
211 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(13(1) (1982). See also Brief for EEOC, supra note 26.
See Brief for EEOC, supra note 26.
Age qualifications are relevant to job performance when they are "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business," or when they are
based upon other reasonable factors in addition to age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f0(1)
(1982). See also 113 CONG. REC. 2467 (1967); Brief for EEOC, supra note 26.
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particular business ... 32
Although Congress created an exception to permit age
distinctions in the case of a BFOQ reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular business,3 3 Con-
gress intended to narrowly limit the scope and application
of this exception. 4 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), which was charged with enforcing
the ADEA, also adopted the same narrow construction of
the BFOQdefense 3 5 A narrow construction of the ADEA
finds further support in the analogous statutory language
32 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1982) (emphasis added).
33 Id.
-4 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(a) (1986). The Department of Labor defined the scope
of the BFOQ defense in the following way:
Whether occupational qualifications will be deemed to be 'bona fide'
and 'reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business', will be determined on the basis of all the pertinent facts
surrounding each particular situation. It is anticipated that this con-
cept of a [BFOQJ will have limited scope and application. Further,
as this is an exception it must be construed narrowly, and the burden
of proof in establishing that it applies is the responsibility of the em-
ployer, employment agency, or labor organization which relies upon
it.
Id. at 860.102(b). Possible BFOQexceptions include federal statutory and regula-
tory requirements which provide compulsory age limitations for hiring, or com-
pulsory retirement, without reference to the individual's physical condition, when
such conditions are clearly imposed for the safety and convenience of the public.
Id. at 860.102(d). An example of such an exception would be the FAA age-sixty
retirement rule for pilots and copilots. Id. See supra note 9 and accompanying text
for an explanation of the FAA's mandatory retirement regulation. The Depart-
ment of Labor also noted that a BFOQexception exists in certain special, individ-
ual occupational circumstances (e.g., actors required for youthful or elderly
characterizations or roles, and persons used to advertise or promote the sale of
products designed for, and directed to appeal exclusively to, either youthful or
elderly consumers). Id. at 860.102(e).
-5 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1986). The EEOC interpreted the BFOQ exception to
be very limited in scope and application. Because it is an exception to the ADEA,
it must be narrowly construed. Id. at 1625.6(a). The EEOC defined the BFOQ
requirements in the following way:
An employee asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving
that (1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the
business, and either (2) that all or substantially all individuals ex-
cluded from the job involved are in fact disqualified, or (3) that some
of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that can-
not be ascertained except by reference to age. If the employer's ob-
jective in asserting a BFOQis the goal of public safety, the employer
must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate that
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contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which also uses the words "reasonably necessary. ' 36 Con-
gress intended the BFOQ like its Title VII counterpart,
to be "an extremely narrow exception to the general pro-
hibition" of age discrimination contained in the ADEA 7
The case history surrounding the enforcement of the
ADEA, and the BFOQ defense in particular, also supports
a narrow construction of the statutory language. In West-
ern Air Lines,3 8 the Supreme Court wholeheartedly sup-
ported the BFOQ defense standard adopted in Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. and consistently followed by
other lower courts.3 9 In Tamiami, the Fifth Circuit evalu-
ated the merits of a BFOQ defense to a claim of age dis-
crimination. 40 Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. had a policy of
refusing to hire intercity bus drivers over the age of forty
on the theory that it was necessary to hire low-risk drivers
in order to ensure the safety of its passengers. 41 The
goal and that there is no acceptable alternative that would better
advance it or equally advance it with less discriminating impact.
Id. at 1625.6(b). The EEOC also noted that the language of the BFOQ closely
tracks that of the BFOQ in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In using
similar language, the EEOC concluded that Congress evidently intended the
ADEA's BFOQ provision to be interpreted in a similarly narrow manner. Brief
for EEOC, supra note 26; see infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text for further
explanation of the similarities between Title VII's BFOQ and the ADEA's BFOQ.
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1964). Title VII states that:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees . . .on the basis of his religion, sex, or
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or na-
tional origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise ....
Id.
7 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (state of Alabama re-
quired that all applicants in employment as "correctional counselor[s]" (prison
guards) meet a minimum weight of 120 pounds and a minimum height of five feet
two inches. The Court held that although the plaintiff had established a prima
facie case of employment discrimination based upon the policy's disproportionate
impact on women under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the policy did
fall within the narrow ambit of Title VII's BFOQ exception).
105 S. Ct. at 2754.
Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 236.
40 Id. at 233-38.
4 Id. at 227-28. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. carries both passengers and baggage
in intrastate and interstate commerce. It operates under certificates of public con-
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court ultimately held that if an employer uses age as an
employment criterion, it must be "reasonably necessary"
to the employer's business.42 In reaching this conclusion,
the court established a two-prong test. The first prong
required the employer to demonstrate that it had set out
certain job qualifications for the position in question that
were "reasonably necessary" to the essence of the em-
ployer's business. 43 The second prong required the em-
ployer to demonstrate either that everyone over the age
venience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Florida Public Service Commission. As a regulated common carrier, Tamiami op-
erates innumerable scheduled runs, sight-seeing tours, and other special pleasure
excursions. Id. at 227. The drivers' schedules are often unpredictable, demand-
ing, and physically exhaustive. Id. at 231. Tamiami attempted to demonstrate
that the protection of public safety necessitated a strict hiring policy based upon
age. Tamiami introduced statistical evidence indicating a correlation between age
and accident frequency. Id. at 237. Tamiami also introduced testimony from both
medical and transportation experts. Dr. Harold Brandalone, a recognized medi-
cal expert in the field of transportation and motor vehicle accidents, testified that
while chronological age did not automatically indicate that individuals could not
adjust to the rigors of certain bus-driving schedules, medical science could not
accurately separate chronological from functional or physiological age. Id. He
concluded that certain physiological and psychological changes which accompany
advancing age decrease a person's ability to drive safely, and that even the most
refined medical examinations could not detect all of these changes. Id. He ex-
pressed an opinion that forty years of age was not an arbitrary hiring cutoff, and
that such a policy could validly be used to screen out these physiological and psy-
chological impairments. Id.
Dr. Ernest G. Fox, a recognized expert in the transportation field, explained the
strains on intercity bus drivers and the importance of the driver's relationship to
traffic safety. Id. Dr. Cox unequivocally stated that the maximum age qualification
was essential to the normal and safe operation of intercity bus lines. Id.
The Department of Labor, on the other hand, relied primarily upon the rebuttal
testimony of other transportation experts. Dr. Abraham J. Mirkin dismissed any
relationship between age and a person's ability to drive a vehicle safely. Id. at 238.
Kenneth Pierson, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety of the
Department of Transportation, testified that Tamiami's physical examination,
training program, and road test sufficiently screened out those new applicants of
any age who would not be qualified as safe bus drivers, Id.
42 Id. at 236.
4 Id. The origins of this first prong can be found in Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). In
that case Pan American had a female-only qualification for the position of in-flight
cabin attendant, alleging that it was a BFOQ under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The district court upheld the qualification as a BFOQon the basis
that airline passengers preferred the "pleasing environment" and the "cosmetic
effect" provided by female attendants, qualities which male flight attendants were
not able to duplicate. The court of appeals, however, rejected the BFOQdefense,
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limit lacked the qualification, or that some individuals
over the age limit lacked the qualification and those indi-
viduals could not be identified on an individualized ba-
sis.44 The Tamiami court ultimately held that the district
court's determination that the bus company's policy of re-
fusing to hire persons over age forty for initial employ-
ment as intercity bus drivers was a BFOQ reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of its business was not
clearly erroneous, and, therefore, affirmed the decision.45
The Tamiami standard has been followed by every circuit
that has addressed this issue.46
The effectiveness of the ADEA in preventing age dis-
holding that these considerations were merely "tangential to the essence of the
business involved." Id. at 389.
44 Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235-36. The second prong of this test derives from
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). Southern
Bell had a male-only qualification for the position of switchman, asserting that it
was a BFOQ under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court noted
that: "It may be that where an employer sustains its burden in demonstrating that
it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with women on an individualized
basis, it may apply a reasonable general rule." Id. at 235 n.5. A mere factual basis
for believing that individual evaluations cannot practically separate the qualified
from the unqualified is insufficient to meet this standard. Id.
45 Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 238.
40 See, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 753 (7th Cir.
1983) (city policy requiring all "protective service" employees including firefight-
ers to retire at age fifty five did not constitute valid BFOQunder ADEA); Tuohy v.
Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 844-45 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that genuine issue
of material fact existed with respect to whether corporate employer's mandatory
age-sixty retirement policy for its private corporate pilots was reasonably neces-
sary to essence of its business in accordance with ADEA requirement); Stewart v.
Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 491 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that Bureau of Prison's
policy of refusing to consider any applicant over the age of thirty-four for jobs
within correctional facilities qualified as valid BFOQ within meaning of ADEA);
EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1982)(holding that
unsubstantiated assumptions that older people are unable to adequately perform
tasks of particular job are condemned by ADEA; and that where an employer
merely asserts that job involves safety considerations, absent any evidence as to
the effects of age on safe performance, summary judgment on the existence of a
BFOQ is inappropriate); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir.
1977)(holding that court must provide plaintiff, police officer applicant, with op-
portunity to rebut city's affidavit stating reasons in support of thirty-five year age
limit for original appointees to police force pursuant to city's asserted BFOQde-
fense under the ADEA); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561,
564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977) (holding that age does not consti-
tute BFOQ exception to ADEA with respect to test pilot where employer's evi-
dence related to changes that accompany aging process in general population,
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crimination in employment has centered around the first
prong of the BFOQ test: the "reasonably necessary"
standard. Various parties have argued that the "reason-
ably necessary" prong of the test set forth in Tamiami4 7
actually requires only a "reasonable" basis for imposing
age restrictions in employment in order to establish a
valid BFOQ defense.48 In Harriss v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc.,'9 a case brought under Title VII, the court
adopted the two-prong test set forth in Tamiami 50 and re-
jected a less stringent "reasonable" standard in applying
the BFOQ 5' The trial court found that Pan American
had formulated "a reasonable general rule" by which it ex-
cluded all female flight attendants from work during preg-
nancy on the ground of their possible disability during an
inflight emergency.52 The Ninth Circuit, however, stated
that:
The flaw in the district court's standard as it applies to the
BFOQ defense is that it requires only that the policy be
'reasonable' in light of the safety factor rather than 'rea-
sonably necessary'. . . . Adoption of such a standard here
would unnecessarily broaden the BFOQ defense which
the Supreme Court characterized in Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 334 ... (1977), as 'an extremely narrow ex-
while employee's evidence tended to show that aging process occurs more slowly
and to lesser degree among pilots and that accident rate decreases with age).
47 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Tami-
ani BFOQ test.
4, See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.
1980), reh'g denied, 74 F.R.D. 24 (1981).
49 Id.
50 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
Tamiami BFOQ test.
51 Harriss, 649 F.2d at 676.
. Id. The district court specifically determined that passenger safety was the
essence of Pan Am's business. Pan American World Airways, 437 F. Supp. 413,
434 (1980). The district court recognized a valid BFOQ defense under Title VII
based upon the court's findings that it was "highly impractical" to deal with preg-
nant flight attendants on an individualized basis, and that Pan Am had applied a
"reasonable general rule." Id. at 435. The district court appeared to reason that
the safety factor was so significant that any policy which was "reasonably calcu-
lated to further safety" was also "reasonably necessary" in light of Pan Am's strict
safety obligations to the public. Harriss, 649 F.2d at 670. See also Criswell, 709
F.2d at 550.
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ception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of sex.'
5 3
The Harriss court held that applying a "reasonable"
standard as opposed to a "reasonably necessary" stan-
dard to BFOQdefenses in ADEA cases would significantly
weaken the force and effectiveness of the ADEA, contra-
dicting the spirit of the law as set out by Congress and
enforced by previous courts. 4 Although the Tamiami test
requires employers to demonstrate that age-related em-
ployment criteria are "reasonably necessary" to the es-
sence of an employer's business, an employer must also
satisfy the second prong of the Tamiami BFOQ defense by
demonstrating that there is a factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons over a specified age
would be unable to perform the duties of the job safely
and efficiently, or that it is impossible or impracticable to
distinguish on an individualized basis those older workers
who could perform adequately from the older workers
who could not.55 "Reasonableness" or "factual basis for
believing" are acceptable standards to apply only when
evaluating the second prong of the Tamiami test.56 In
53 Harriss, 649 F.2d at 677. Despite its rejection of the district court's "reason-
able general rule" standard, the Ninth Circuit held that in light of the district
court's factual findings regarding the significance of the safety risk involved in
allowing pregnant flight attendants to continue flying, Pan Am's pregnancy policy
was "reasonably necessary" to passenger safety. Id. See Harriss, 437 F. Supp. at
420-23 and nn. 10-15.
54 Hariss, 649 F.2d at 676-77. The mere fact that an employment policy is "rea-
sonable" does not necessarily justify the conclusion that such a policy is "reason-
ably necessary" to the essence of a particular busines. Id. at 677. The
"reasonably necessary" standard requires a narrower scope and application, and
more closely aligns itself with the congressional intent surrounding the adoption
of the BFOQ exception. Id.
5. Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 236.
' See, e.g., EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that court's maximum hiring age of thirty five for the jobs of dep-
uty sheriff and fire helicopter pilot did not constitute a BFOQ under the ADEA);
County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d at 376; Hariss, 649 F.2d at 676; Tamiami, 531
F.2d at 236.
One possible reason why the second prong of the BFOQ test is less stringent
than the first prong may be that, if the ADEA requires an employer to establish
the "reasonable necessity" of an age-related employment criterion to the essence
of his business, the ADEA has sufficiently narrowed the scope and application of
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sum, in order to establish a valid BFOQ an employer
must, without exception, demonstrate that any age-re-
lated employment criterion is "reasonably necessary" to
the essence of his business.
II. WESTERN AIR LINES, INC. V. CRISWELL
In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,58 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the "rea-
sonably necessary" standard was appropriate in evaluat-
ing a BFOQ defense to an age-sixty retirement policy for
flight engineers.59 Western first defended its policy on
the ground that reasonable factors other than age man-
dated its decision to retire the respondents.6 ° Western
also defended by claiming that its policy of retiring flight
engineers at age sixty constituted a BFOQ reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of its business. 6' Both
sides submitted conflicting evidence regarding the nature
of the flight engineer's tasks, the physiological and psy-
chological traits required to perform them, and the occur-
rence of those traits in persons over the age of sixty.6 2 On
the BFOQdefense in accordance with congressional intent. This enables the sec-
ond prong of the test to focus on the justifications asserted for establishing such
an employment policy - in particular - public safety. A mere "factual basis for
believing" that certain safety-threatening conditions may go undetected if dealt
with on an individual basis will satisfy the second prong of the BFOQ test. See
County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d at 1043 (fear of undetected heart disease); Harriss,
649 F.2d at 675 (fear of pregnant flight attendant's inability to perform safely and
efficiently during an unexpected emergency).
57 See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion of the
"reasonably necessary" standard.
58 105 S. Ct. 2743.
- Id. at 2747.
-0 Criswell, 514 F. Supp. at 388. Western claimed that it based its rejection of
the Criswell and Starley bids upon the neutral operation of a bona fide seniority
system which permitted downbidding (transferring from Captain to First or Sec-
ond Officer) only in very limited and exceptional circumstances. See id. at 392-93
for a thorough discussion of the downbidding issue. Based upon the evidence
presented, the district court rejected Western's argument that its seniority system
and downbidding policy constituted reasonable factors other than age which
could justify Western's mandatory retirement policy for flight engineers. Id.
-il Id. at 388.
1;2 Id. at 389. Western's expert witness, a former FAA Deputy Federal Air Sur-
geon, expressed concern with the possibility of a cardiovascular event such as a
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appeal, however, Western Air Lines specifically chal-
lenged the trial court's jury instruction on the BFOQ de-
fense, claiming that it was insufficiently deferential to the
airline's legitimate concern for the safety of its passen-
gers. Instead, Western claimed that a "rational basis in
fact" rather than "reasonably necessary" standard should
have been used in evaluating the first prong of the BFOQ
defense.63
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court first ex-
amined whether the trial court's standards for raising the
BFOQ defense properly reflected the requirements of the
ADEA 64 and whether those requirements were consistent
with the safety responsibilities of public carriers.65 In do-
ing so, the Court analyzed the legislative history and prior
case law surrounding the ADEA and the BFOQ excep-
tion.66 The Court then addressed the issue of whether the
heart attack. He testified that "with advancing age the likelihood of onset of dis-
ease increases and that in persons over age 60 it could not be predicted whether
and when such diseases would occur." Id. That same expert, however, also testi-
fied that during the period that he was the Deputy Federal Air Surgeon, he never
recommended or advocated that the FAA age-sixty rule be applied to flight engi-
neers. Id. at 390. The medical experts, on the other hand, testified that physio-
logical deterioration is caused by disease, not aging, and that "it was feasible to
determine on the basis of individual medical examinations whether flight deck
crew members, including those over age 60, were physically qualified to continue
to fly." Id. at 389. The district court went on to state:
The record also reveals that both the FAA and the airlines have been
able to deal with the health problems of pilots on an individualized
basis. Pilots who have been grounded because of alcoholism or car-
diovascular disease have been recertified by the FAA and allowed to
resume flying. Pilots who were unable to pass the necessary exami-
nation to maintain their FAA first class medical certificates, but who
continued to qualify for second class medical certificates were al-
lowed to 'downgrade' from pilot to [flight engineer]. There is noth-
ing in the record to indicate that these flight deck crew members are
physically better able to perform their duties than flight engineers
over age 60 who have not experienced such events or that they are
less likely to become incapacitated.
Id. at 390.
'' Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2749. See also Criswell, 709 F.2d at 549-51.
' See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the trial
court's presentation of the issues in Western Air Lines.
65 Id.
- See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history and intent of the ADEA and BFOQ exception.
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statutory language "reasonably necessary" should be spe-
cifically enumerated in the jury charge.67 Finally, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a "rational
basis in fact" standard is sufficient for establishing a
BFOQ defense.6 8
The primary questions presented to the Court were
whether the trial court's BFOQ standards properly re-
flected the requirements of the ADEA, and whether those
requirements were consistent with the safety responsibili-
ties of public carriers.6 9 The trial judge instructed the
jury that the defendant must establish, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the age-related employment cri-
terion was reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the defendant's business in order for the defendant to
prevail on its BFOQ defense.7 °
Western argued that, because the potential for loss of
life as a result of aircraft accidents was so great, the Court
67 See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of appropriate
jury instructions in BFOQ cases.
- See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "rational
basis in fact" standard.
69 Brief for EEOC, supra note 26.
70 Criswell, 514 F. Supp. at 389-90 n.7. The trial judge instructed the jury as
follows:
BFOQ Defense. If you find that plaintiffs have persuaded you by a
preponderance of the evidence that their involuntary retirements
were the result of policies in which age discrimination was a deter-
mining factor, then you must consider defendant's defense that age
is a 'bona fide occupational qualification' for its Second Officers
(flight engineers). This defense is usually abbreviated 'BFOQ'. The
BFOQ defense is available only if it is reasonably necessary to the
normal operation-essence-of defendant's business. In this regard, I
instruct you that the normal operation-essence-of Western's busi-
ness is the safe transportation of air passengers.
The burden of proof to show a BFOQ is on the defendant. If de-
fendant establishes such a BFOQ by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, then its age discrimination is lawful under the ADEA.
One method by which defendant Western may establish a BFOQ
in this case is to prove
(1) that in 1978, when these plaintiffs were retired, it was highly im-
practical for Western to deal with each Second Officer over age 60
on an individualized basis to determine his particular ability to per-
form his job safely, and
(2) that some Second Officers (flight engineers) over age 60 possess
traits of a physiological, or other nature which preclude safe and effi-
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must afford commercial airlines a degree of flexibility and
discretion in setting job qualifications for employees in
positions affecting passenger safety.7 ' Western argued
that the jury instructions failed to adequately recognize
this overriding interest in safety. 72 Western proposed in-
structions which would have told the jury that a mere "ra-
tional basis in fact" was sufficient to justify an age-related
BFOQ.73 In essence, Western objected to the inclusion of
the statutory language "reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of a particular business" in the jury instruc-
tion on the ground that such an instruction failed to
properly recognize Western's interest in protecting public
safety. 4
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court analyzed
cient job performance that cannot be ascertained by means other
than knowing their age.
In evaluating the practicability to defendant Western of dealing
with Second Officers over age 60 on an individualized basis, with
respect to the medical testimony you should consider the state of the
medical art as it existed in July 1978.
Id.
I' Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1. Western argued that the federal "duty ...
to perform Western's services with the highest possible degree of safety in the
public interest" required the court to exercise great deference toward any em-
ployment policy designed to promulgate flight safety standards. Id. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1421(b)(1982).
72 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1. Western challenged the trial court's BFOQ
instruction on several grounds. First, Western alleged that the charge failed to
even mention the deference due to Western's selection of job qualifications for
the position of flight engineer that are reasonable in light of the safety risks. Id.
Second, Western objected that the charge placed the burden of proof upon West-
ern to establish that it is impossible or impracticable to determine, on an individ-
ual basis, which persons over age sixty do and do not possess the qualifications
Western has determined are necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the
duties of flight engineer. Id. Western also alleged that the jury charge failed to
allow it to conduct its operations with the highest degree of safety possible. Id.
7s Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 5. Western proposed jury instructions
which would have enabled the jury (1) to consider that the underlying rationale of
the FAA age-sixty retirement rule for pilots constitutes a rational basis in fact for a
BFOQ) and to find for defendant Western on the BFOQ issue without consider-
ing any other evidence; and (2) to disregard medical testimony and simply decide
whether an airline such as Western with its duty to maintain the highest possible
safety for its passengers had on the basis of the totality of that evidence a rational
basis in fact for believing that use of flight engineers over age sixty would increase
the risk of harm or death to any one of its passengers. Id.
74 Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 5-6.
790 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
the legislative history behind the enactment of the ADEA
and the BFOQ exception. 75  The Court noted that,
"[t]hroughout the legislative history of the ADEA, one
empirical fact is repeatedly emphasized: the process of
psychological and physiological degeneration caused by
aging varies with each individual. '76 Additionally, the
Court recognized that the BFOQ exception to age-related
employment criteria has only "limited scope and applica-
tion" and "must be construed narrowly. '77 The Court,
citing Dothard, stated that:
The restrictive language of the statute, and the consistent
interpretation of the administrative agencies charged with
enforcing the statute convince us that, like its Title VII
counterpart, the BFOQexception 'was in fact meant to be
an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition'
of age discrimination contained in the ADEA.78
In analyzing prior case law regarding the enforcement
of the BFOQ exception, the Court, in a unanimous deci-
sion, 79 analyzed the Tamiami 80 rule and adopted it whole-
heartedly,8 ' concluding that Western's age-sixty
mandatory retirement of flight engineers was in violation
of the ADEA and did not qualify as a BFOQ exception. 2
In order for Western's retirement policy to have qualified
as a BFOQ it would have had to be (1) "reasonably nec-
essary" to further the overriding interest in public safety,
and (2) (a) the employer must have had reasonable cause
to believe (i.e., a factual basis for believing) that all or sub-
stantially all persons over the age qualification would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently in light of the du-
7. Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2749-5 1.
76 Id. at 2749. The court noted "that there is a wide range of individual physical
ability regardless of age," emphasizing that many older American workers per-
form at levels equal or superior to the levels of their younger counterparts. Id.
77 Id. at 2750. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b)(1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1986).
78 Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2751 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334).
79 Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. Id. at 2756.
" See supra note 39-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Tamiami
decision.
8, Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2753.
I2 d. at 2756.
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ties involved or (b) the employer must have established
that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with
older employees on an individualized basis.8a The Court
concluded that:
Considering the narrow language of the BFOQ exception,
the parallel treatment of such questions under Title VII,
and the uniform application of the standard by the federal
courts, the EEOC and Congress, we conclude that this
two-part inquiry properly identifies the relevant considera-
tions for resolving a BFOQ defense to an age-based quali-
fication purportedly justified by considerations of safety.8 4
At trial Western preserved an objection to any jury in-
struction which mirrored the language of the Tamiami
two-part inquiry, claiming that any instruction including
the phrase "reasonably necessary" to the normal opera-
tion of the employer's business confuses the jury and is
irrelevant to their deliberations.8 5 The court of appeals
rejected Western's proposed instruction that would have
allowed the airline to succeed on a BFOQdefense merely
by establishing a "rational basis in fact" for believing that
the use of flight engineers over age sixty would increase
the likelihood of risk to its passengers.8 6 In argument
before the Supreme Court, however, Western acknowl-
edged that the Tamiami standard identifies the relevant
general inquiries that must be made in evaluating the
BFOQ defense, but Western claimed that the trial court's
instructions were, nevertheless, insufficiently protective of
public safety.8 7 The Supreme Court, however, rejected
ss Id. at 2751-52 (citing Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235).
84 Id. at 2753. The Court recognized that age qualifications must be more than
merely convenient or reasonably related to some public safety interest. The age
qualifications must be "reasonably necessary" to the essence of the particular
business. An age-related employment policy satisfies this "reasonably necessary"
standard only when the employer is compelled to rely on age as a proxy for the
safety-related job qualifications. Id. at 2751.
8' d. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
8o Criswell, 709 F.2d at 549-51.
87 Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2753. Western also argued that the airline's
public safety interest requires that flight engineers meet the same stringent quali-
fications as pilots, and that, therefore, the Court should extend the FAA age-sixty
retirement rule to flight engineers. Id. at 2754. See supra note 9 and accompany-
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this proposal, stating that Western's public safety argu-
ment was:
plainly at odds with Congress' decision, in adopting the
ADEA, to subject such management decisions to a test of
objective justification in a court of law. The BFOQ stan-
dard adopted in the statute is one of 'reasonable neces-
sity,' not reasonableness. 88
The Court reasoned that, in adopting the BFOQ stan-
dards, Congress did not ignore the public interest in
ing text for a discussion of the FAA retirement rule. The Court rejected this argu-
ment, stating that the extent to which the FAA's policy for pilots should also apply
to flight engineers depends upon the weight of the evidence supporting its safety
rationale and the congruity between the positions of pilot and flight engineer.
Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2754. The Court held that the evidence clearly
established that the FAA, Western, and other airlines all recognized the less rigor-
ous nature of qualifications necessary for the position of flight engineer. Id.
Western, for instance, allows Captains under the age of sixty, who for medical
reasons cannot continue flying as a pilot or copilot, to downbid to the position of
flight engineer. Criswell, 709 F.2d at 552. In addition, over half the pilots flying
in the United States are flying for major airlines which do not require flight engi-
neers to retire at the age of sixty, and there are over 200 such flight engineers
currently flying on widebodied aircraft. Id.
The FAA, in refusing to adopt a mandatory retirment age for flight engineers,
also noted the differences between the duties and responsibilities of pilots and
flight engineers. 49 Fed. Reg. 14,693-95 (1984). Flight engineers are subject to
the same risks of diminishing health and performance to which pilots are subject.
Id. at 14,693. Although flight engineers perform many important tasks (i.e.,
monitering the electrical, fuel, pneumatic, and hydraulic systems), they are not as
critical to the safety of the airplane as are pilots. Id. at 14,693-94. Flight engi-
neers serve in a secondary support position. They generally never operate the
primary controls of the aircraft. Due to their physical location in the cockpit, they
are unable to make substantial contributions to the critical, complex tasks of flight
control. Flight engineers' duties require considerably less skill and reaction time
than the duties of pilots. Id. at 14,694. Increasingly, various planes no longer
require the use of flight engineers. Id. The FAA found that the evidence available
did not justify imposing an age-sixty limit on the position of flight engineer. Id.
" Western Air Lines, 105 S. Ct. at 2754. The Court reasoned that when an em-
ployer establishes that an age-related job qualification has been carefully designed
to respond to documented concerns for public safety, the "unreasonably neces-
sary" standard will not unduly burden the employer in his efforts to persuade the
trier of fact that the qualification constitutes a valid BFOQ. Id. The Court noted
that "[t]he uncertainty implicit in the concept of managing safety risks always
makes it 'reasonably necessary' to err on the side of caution in a close call." Id. A
"reasonably necessary" standard does not require the employer to establish with
certainty that there is a risk of an airline accident because such a standard would
mandate permitting the risk until a tragic accident did eventually occur. Id.
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safety.8 9 The Court found that the "reasonably neces-
sary" test adequately reflects such an interest since, in
light of the airlines' interest in safety, it would be "reason-
ably necessary" for an airline to err on the side of caution
in cases such as this. 90
The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of whether
a "rational basis in fact" standard sufficiently establishes a
BFOQ. 91 The Court concluded that because such a stan-
dard deviates significantly from the meaning conveyed by
the statutory phrase "reasonably necessary," a "rational
basis in fact" standard is an inappropriate basis for apply-
ing age-related employment criterion and, consequently,
such a standard was properly rejected by the trial court
defense.92 The Court further noted that the "rational ba-
sis" standard does not comport with the preference for an
individual evaluation of an employee's merits as ex-
pressed in the language and legislative history of the
ADEA.95 The Court recognized that the purpose of the
ADEA is to require employers to evaluate employees on
their merits rather than their age,94 and the purpose of
the BFOQ is to provide only a limited exception to this
general rule by requiring employers to establish that any
age-related employment standards are "reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of the particular business." 95
The Court concluded that the application of any standard
89 Id.
90 Id. The Court concluded that:
When the employer's argument has a credible basis in the record, it
is difficult to believe that a jury of lay persons-many of whom no
doubt have flown or could expect to fly on commercial air carriers-
would not defer in a close case to the airline's judgment. Since the
instructions in this case would not have prevented the airline from
raising this contention to the jury, we are satisfied that the verdict is
a consequence of a defect in Western's proof rather than a defect in
the trial court's instructions.
Id.
91 Id. at 2755.
2 Id.
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less stringent than the "reasonably necessary" standard
would undermine the intent of the legislature in adopting
the ADEA and would abandon the path set forth by previ-
ous case law in enforcing the ADEA in general, and the
BFOQ defense in particular.9 6
III. CONCLUSION
In Western Air Lines the Supreme Court manifested its
recognition of and support for the legislative intent be-
hind the adoption of the ADEA. If the Court had re-
placed the "reasonably necessary" standard with a milder
"factual basis for believing" criterion, the new criterion
would have greatly circumscribed the effectiveness of the
ADEA in combatting age discrimination. The Supreme
Court demonstrated its intention to accept a BFOQ de-
fense only in very limited and exceptional circumstances:
when the age qualification is "reasonably necessary" to an
employer's business, and when individualized testing
would be highly impractical. Rather than changing the
"reasonably necessary" standard previously utilized by
the lower courts, the Supreme Court fully endorsed it.
The Western Air Lines decision clearly and unequivocally
emphasized the objective, rather than subjective, nature
of the BFOQ test. If the Court had applied a subjective
standard (i.e., "factual basis for believing"), as Western
desired, the decision would have greatly minimized the
beneficial effects of the ADEA and would have conflicted
with the purpose of the ADEA's enactment-to overcome
the erroneous subjective beliefs held by many employers
regarding the productivity level of older workers. As a re-
sult of the decision, the airline industry, as well as other
industries in general, must carefully scrutinize all age-
based qualifications in light of a "reasonably necessary"
standard. In concluding its opinion, the Court stated:
" Id. The Court recognized that, while it may be "rational" to require all em-
ployees to retire at any age less than 70, that result would be inconsistent with
Congress' direction that employers must justify the rationale for the age chosen.
Id.
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When an employee covered by the Act is able to point to
reputable businesses in the same industry that choose to
eschew reliance on mandatory retirement earlier than age
70, when the employer itself relies on individualized test-
ing in similar circumstances, and when the administrative
agency with primary responsibility for maintaining airline
safety has determined that individualized testing is not im-
practical for the relevant position, the employer's attempt
to justify its decision on the basis of the contrary opinion
of experts-solicited for the purposes of litigation-is
hardly convincing on any objective standard short of com-
plete deference. Even in cases involving public safety, the
ADEA plainly does not permit the trier of fact to give com-
plete deference to the employer's decision. 7
As a result of the Supreme Court's wholehearted endorse-
ment of the "reasonably necessary" objective standard for
evaluating a BFOQ exception to age-based hiring criteria,
employers face a very difficult challenge in justifying a be-
low-age-seventy mandatory retirement policy.
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